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My dissertation examines the strategic impacts of IT-enabled platforms on 
entrepreneurial and innovation activities. Specifically, I explore the behaviors of 
both investors and entrepreneurs in online crowdfunding markets that have the 
potential to democratize access to capital and investment opportunities. In my first 
essay, I examine the role of experts in a crowdfunding market. While 
conventional wisdom considers a crowdfunding market as a mechanism to 
democratize decision making and reduce reliance on experts, I find that experts 
still play a pivotal role in these markets. In particular, I find that the early 
investments by experts serve as credible signals of quality for the crowd, and have 
  
a significant impact on the crowd’s investment decisions. In my second essay, I 
analyze whether crowdfunding democratizes access to capital for entrepreneurs. I 
find that difficult access to credit from traditional sources induces entrepreneurs 
to rely more on crowdfunding as a viable alternative, while this effect varies 
across project types and across areas. In each essay, I analyze micro-level data 
from online crowdfunding markets with a variety of econometric methods. The 
results have important theoretical and practical implications for questions ranging 
from the design of online crowdfunding markets to competition between online 
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CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW 
 
Advances in basic digital technologies, along with global business trends, 
are enabling more people to have easier access to ideas and resources from around 
the world. Especially, the ability of online ‘crowdsourcing’ markets to bring 
together individuals and businesses has transformed and redefined the way 
innovation is conducted. Crowdsourcing “represents the act of a company or 
institution taking a function once performed by employees and outsourcing it to 
an undefined (and generally large) network of people in the form of an open call. 
This can take the form of peer-production (when the job is performed 
collectively), but is also often undertaken by sole individuals.” (Howe 2006). This 
technology has been used in a variety of areas such as online labor market, 
innovation contest, and distributed knowledge, thereby enabling wider and easier 
access to ideas and resources.  
Crowdfunding derives from the concept of crowdsourcing and has 
emerged as a viable alternative to traditional sources of financing by financial 
institutions, venture capitalists, and angel investors. The objective of 
crowdfunding is to raise funds from a large number of investors for a variety of 
projects. In contrast to the traditional model of raising funds from a small number 
of sophisticated investors, crowdfunding seeks to obtain smaller amounts of 
funding from a number of individual investors – the crowd. This can take the 






Crowdfunding, as a phenomenon,  has grown rapidly in recent years, 
attracting an estimated $5.1 billion worldwide in 2013 alone.
1
 Kickstarter, one of 
the leading online crowdfunding marketplaces, had received about $480 million 
in pledges in 2013 alone.
2
 It has been widely used to support a variety of projects 
including entrepreneurial ventures, social ventures, creative works, citizen 
journalism, and scientific research. Recently, the World Bank commissioned a 
study on how crowdfunding could be applied internationally and what its 
potential could be for affecting entrepreneurship in developing countries. The 
study predicts a $93 billion equivalent crowdfunding market by 2025.
3
  
With the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, crowdfunding has 
also begun to attract a lot of attention from policy makers and regulators. It makes 
it easier for ordinary investors to participate in entrepreneurial ventures that were 
up-to-now only reserved to sophisticated investors. When signing the JOBS Act 
in April 2012, President Obama announced that “Startups and small businesses 
will be allowed to raise up to $1 million annually from many small-dollar 
investors through web-based platforms, democratizing access to capital”.
4
 Despite 
the rapid growth and popularity of online crowdfunding marketplaces as well as 
their potential to democratize access to capital and investment opportunity, there 
have been very few systematic studies of these markets.  
















My dissertation examines the strategic impacts of online crowdfunding 
markets on entrepreneurial and innovation activities. Specifically, I explore the 
behaviors of both investors and entrepreneurs in online crowdfunding markets 
that have the potential to democratize access to capital and investment 
opportunities. In my first essay, I examine the role of experts in a crowdfunding 
market. In crowd-driven markets like crowdfunding markets, the conventional 
wisdom says that the crowd has the powerful tool to help them access ideas and 
resources more efficiently and effectively, thereby making them have more 
independent decision and rely less on experts in these markets. Thus, my first 
essay examines the role of experts in a crowdfunding market by examining 
dynamic behaviors of investors in the market. In my second essay, I now focus on 
entrepreneurs’ behaviors and analyze whether crowdfunding democratizes access 
to capital for entrepreneurs by exploiting geographical variation in crowdfunding 
activity in the U.S.   
The first essay in my dissertation examines the role of experts in an online 
crowdfunding market. Using a novel data set on individual investments in a 
crowdfunding market for mobile applications, I investigate whether early 
investments serve as signals of quality for later investors, and if the value of these 
signals differs depending on the identity of early investors. I also investigate if 
these signals are indeed credible as measured by the ex-post performance of these 
projects and investments.  
I find that while early investors have a significant influence on later 






among the early investors, two categories of experts — app developer investors 
and experienced investors—have a significant influence on the later investors - 
the crowd. More interestingly, the specifics of their expertise determine their 
influence. App developer investors who have a better knowledge of the product 
are found to be more influential for “concept apps” (apps in the pre-release stage), 
while experienced investors – investors with a better knowledge of market 
performance are found to be more influential for “live apps” (apps that are already 
being sold in the market). My findings show that the majority of investors in this 
market – the crowd – although inexperienced, are rather sophisticated in their 
ability to identify and exploit nuanced differences in the informational content of 
the investments made by these different experts. In examining the ex-post 
performance of apps, I find that successful funding in the market is positively 
associated with ex-post app sales and that the quality signals provided by the 
experts’ investment choices are indeed credible. 
This essay makes a number of significant contributions. It is among the 
first to provide systematic evidence of the role of experts in crowd-based markets 
with detailed individual-level data. In addition to highlighting the role of experts, 
this essay also shows how their influence can vary depending on their expertise, 
an issue overlooked in the existing literature on opinion leadership. This study 
also adds to the literature on signaling by showing the nuanced effects of the 
signals provided by different types of investors in an online crowdfunding market. 
Lastly, given the infancy of online crowdfunding, understanding investor 






wisdom considers crowdsourcing and crowdfunding markets as mechanisms for 
empowering the masses and democratizing expertise. Contrary to popular 
perceptions, our initial findings indicate that despite the freedom of choice 
provided by these decentralized markets, the crowd’s decisions are highly 
influenced by experts participating in these markets. 
The second essay examines the role of crowdfunding in democratizing 
access to capital by looking how geography affects the formation of crowdfunded 
projects. I collect data on housing prices and local credit markets that are closely 
related to the cost of accessing traditional sources of credit and matched these 
data to a novel data set from a leading crowdfunding market. I then examine 
whether entrepreneurs with limited access to traditional sources of financing have 
a higher propensity to use crowdfunding. In order to identify the causal effect of 
the credit availability proxied by housing prices I instrument for the change in 
housing prices between 2009 and 2012 using the measure of housing supply 
elasticity developed by Saiz (2010), which exploits exogenous geographical and 
regulatory restrictions on housing supply. Next, I investigate whether this effect 
varies across different cities with a particular attention paid to income differences. 
Third, I examine whether this effect varies across categories. 
I find that small cities appear to get a disproportionate benefit from 
crowdfunding. My findings also show that difficult access to credit from local 
banks induces entrepreneurs to rely more on crowdfunding. Moreover, tighter 
credit constraints due to a drop in housing prices have a stronger effect on 






impact of a local credit market structure is almost entirely via ‘location-
independent’ projects that attract less funding from local people. Overall, I 
provide evidence that web-enabled crowdfunding has the potential to democratize 
access to capital in that it can be a viable option for entrepreneurs having 
difficulty accessing traditional offline channels of credit. 
This study makes several significant contributions to the relevant literature. 
First, my study is the first to show systematic evidence of a significant 
relationship between local credit conditions and the use of crowdfunding in the 
local region. In this regard, my study complements recent empirical studies 
shedding light on the importance of geography in the context of crowdfunding 
(Agrawal et al. 2011; Lin and Viswanathan 2013; Mollick 2012). Second, my 
study contributes to a body of empirical literature on the consumer substitution 
between online and offline channels (Anderson et al. 2010; Brynjolfsson et al. 
2009; Choi and Bell 2011; Ellison and Ellison 2009; Forman et al. 2009; Ghose et 
al. 2012; Goolsbee 2000, 2001; Langer et al. 2012). Finally, and more broadly, 
this study extends the growing body of literature that examines how IT-mediated 
online platforms contribute to consumer welfare. The literature has shown how 
online platforms benefit consumers with increased product variety (Brynjolfsson 
et al. 2003), lower transaction costs (Overby and Jap 2009), higher price elasticity 
(Granados et al. 2012) and better information about product quality (Mudambi 
and Schuff 2010). I contribute to this literature by showing that online 






In conclusion, in each essay I analyze micro-level data from online 
crowdfunding markets with a variety of econometric methods. The results have 
important theoretical and practical implications for questions ranging from the 
design of online crowdfunding markets to competition between online and offline 








CHAPTER 2: THE EXPERTS IN THE CROWD: THE ROLE 




This paper examines the role of experts in an online crowdfunding market. Using 
a novel data set on individual investments in a crowdfunding market for mobile 
applications, we investigate whether early investments serve as signals of quality 
for later investors, and if the value of these signals differs depending on the 
identity of early investors. We find that while early investors have a significant 
influence on later investors, not all early investors are equally influential. 
Specifically, we find that among the early investors, two categories of experts — 
app developer investors and experienced investors—have a significant influence 
on the later investors - the crowd. More interestingly, the specifics of their 
expertise determine their influence. App developer investors who have a better 
knowledge of the product are found to be more influential for “concept apps” 
(apps in the pre-release stage), while experienced investors – investors with a 
better knowledge of market performance are found to be more influential for “live 
apps” (apps that are already being sold in the market). Our findings show that the 
majority of investors in this market – the crowd – although inexperienced, are 
rather sophisticated in their ability to identify and exploit nuanced differences in 
the informational content of the investments made by these different experts. In 
examining the ex-post performance of apps, we find that successful funding in the 
market is positively associated with ex-post app sales and that the quality signals 






popular perceptions of crowdfunding markets as means for democratizing 
expertise and as substitutes for traditional expert-dominated mechanisms, our 
findings indicate that despite the choice provided by these crowd-based markets, 




Online crowdfunding markets have emerged as a viable alternative to 
traditional sources of financing by financial institutions, venture capitalists, and 
angel investors. Crowdfunding derives from the concept of crowdsourcing, which 
refers to the process of obtaining ideas, opinions, and solutions from an 
anonymous crowd (Howe 2008). The objective of crowdfunding is to raise funds 
from a large number of investors for a variety of projects. In contrast to the 
traditional model of raising funds from a small number of sophisticated investors, 
crowdfunding seeks to obtain smaller amounts of funding from a number of 
individual investors – the crowd. This can take the form of donations, lending, 
rewards, and equity purchases. Crowdfunding, as a phenomenon,  has grown 
rapidly in recent years, attracting an estimated $2.8 billion worldwide in 2012 
alone,
5
 and has been widely used to support a variety of projects including 
entrepreneurial ventures, social ventures, creative works, citizen journalism, and 
scientific research.  With the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, 
crowdfunding has also begun to attract a lot of attention from policy makers and 









regulators. Despite the rapid growth and popularity of online crowdfunding 
marketplaces, there have been very few systematic studies of these markets. 
Understanding the dynamics of investor behavior in these markets and the role of 
mechanisms that help investors manage risks in these nascent markets is crucial to 
the design of successful crowdfunding platforms. 
Crowdfunding differs from traditional mechanisms for financing in a 
number of ways. First, a key difference lies in the investors who participate in 
crowdfunding markets (Agrawal et al. 2013a; Ahlers et al. 2012). Traditional 
investors such as financial institutions, venture capitalists, and angel investors are 
professionals with substantial resources and expertise in evaluating and 
performing stringent reviews of potential investment opportunities. In contrast, 
the vast majority of investors in crowdfunding markets – the crowd - are often 
retail investors who have neither the resources nor the expertise to evaluate the 
risks of competing investment opportunities.  Further, the geographical separation 
between the project owner and the investor prevents the investor from conducting 
a stringent on-site review process (Agrawal et al. 2011). Online crowdfunding 
markets overcome some of these limitations by allowing many small investors to 
pool their resources, thereby reducing their risks. However, with a wide variety of 
geographically dispersed projects and startups competing for funds, investors in 
these noisy markets could always benefit from reliable signals of quality that help 
mitigate their risks (Ahlers et al. 2012). Given the heightened information 
asymmetries in online crowdfunding markets, it is crucial to understand the 






An important feature of online crowdfunding markets is the availability of 
information about investments made by other investors in a given project. In 
particular, given that each project attracts a number of investors, information 
about early investors and their investments in a project is available to subsequent 
investors. Thus, information about peers and their funding activities has the 
potential to play an important role in online crowdfunding markets (Burtch et al. 
2013).  
Our study seeks to examine if the investment decisions by early investors 
influence later investments in these markets, especially by those who are less 
sophisticated. More specifically, we study whether early investments serve as 
signals of quality for later investors and if the value of these signals differs 
depending on the identity of early investors. We also investigate if these signals 
are indeed credible as measured by the ex-post performance of these projects and 
investments. 
We examine these questions in the context of an online crowdfunding 
market for mobile apps. The data for this study comes from Appbackr, one of the 
earliest online crowdfunding marketplaces for mobile apps. Started in October 
2010, Appbackr has emerged as the primary online crowdfunding marketplace for 
entrepreneurs seeking funding for “concept apps” (apps in their conceptual stage 
of development) as well as for “live apps” (apps that have been launched and are 
in need of additional funds).  We collect data on Appbackr listings posted from 
Aug 2010 through June 2013. For each project, the data set contains time-






platform where the app is (or will be) listed, whether the app is live in store) and 
the funding status of the project (e.g., the amount requested, the amount backed, 
the number of backers, days left, return on investment). Our dataset comprises of 
532 apps listed by 396 App Developer Investors, funded by over 3,500 specific 
investments for approximately $1 million. For each listing, we collect a detailed 
set of its attributes and gather information on its funding progression, including 
the amount of funding it has received and the number of investors. In addition, we 
also collect data about app developer- and app-specific characteristics such as 
total downloads of each app.  
We examine the investment choices made by different types of investors. 
We identify three categories of investors – App Developer Investors or investors 
who have sought prior funding for a different app in this market; Experienced 
Investors or investors who have invested in at least 5 prior apps and more than 
$2,000 investments; and the remaining investors – the Crowd. In examining each 
of their investment patterns we find that the experts – the App Developer 
Investors and Experienced Investors – tend to invest early. Given the presence of 
these experts, our study seeks to examine if the investments made by these 
reputable investors serve as quality signals for the crowd, and if so, whether these 
signals are indeed credible.  
Our findings indicate that the crowd indeed learns from the investments 
made by the early investors. However not all early investors are equally 
influential. We find that the crowd is more likely to follow App Developer 






apps that matches their expertise. The crowd is more likely to follow App 
Developer Investors for concept apps, and Experienced Investors for live apps. 
The two categories of experts – App Developer Investors and Experienced 
Investors – are likely to differ in their expertise, the former with a better 
knowledge of the product (product expertise) and latter with a better knowledge 
of market performance (market expertise). Additional analyses also find that the 
influence of these experts further depends on their past performance, which is 
consistent with the conjecture that their influence most likely stems from their 
credibility based on past experience on the platform. Our findings demonstrate 
that the crowd, although inexperienced, are rather sophisticated in their ability to 
identify and exploit nuanced differences between different signals within the same 
market.  
This study makes a number of significant contributions. It is among the 
first to provide systematic evidence of the role of experts in crowd-based markets 
with detailed individual-level data. Recent studies have raised doubts about the 
importance of opinion leaders in non-financial contexts (Godes and Mayzlin 
2009; Watts and Dodds 2007). Our paper builds on prior studies on the value of 
opinion leaders by demonstrating their importance in a decentralized financial 
marketplace. In addition to highlighting the role of experts, our study also shows 
how their influence can vary depending on their expertise, an issue overlooked in 
the existing literature on opinion leadership. This study also adds to the literature 
on signaling by showing the nuanced effects of the signals provided by different 






markets lack the sophisticated quality signaling mechanisms available in well-
developed traditional markets, investors in these online markets are able to 
observe the investment decisions of other individual investors for a given venture 
or startup. The investment decisions made by some of these early investors might 
serve as valuable signals of quality of the investments under consideration. If so, 
these early investors could help mitigate the risks faced by the less experienced 
investors (Agrawal et al. 2011; Ahlers et al. 2012; Lin et al. 2013). Our study is 
among the first to examine these issues in one of the earliest and largest online 
crowdfunding markets for apps. 
This study also contributes to the literature on herding behavior by 
providing evidence of rational herding in crowdfunding markets. While previous 
studies (Bikhchandani and Sharma 2000; Cipriani and Guarino 2005) have 
identified the influence of early movers or later investors, ours is among the first 
study to provide evidence of the importance of the identity of these early 
investors. We find that not all early investors are equally influential – only the 
experts among these early investors have a significant influence on the 
investments by later investors. Lastly, given the infancy of online crowdfunding, 
understanding investor behavior in these nascent markets is important for their 
success. Conventional wisdom considers crowdsourcing and crowdfunding 
markets as mechanisms for empowering the masses and democratizing expertise. 
Contrary to popular perceptions, our initial findings indicate that despite the 
freedom of choice provided by these decentralized markets, the crowd’s decisions 






practical implications for the design of crowdfunding markets and, more 
importantly, for the development of policy and prescriptive guidelines for such 
markets. 
2.2 Literature Review 
Our study draws on a number of streams of research – one being the 
literature on opinion leadership. One argument in this literature is the “influential 
hypothesis”- the idea that influential individuals accelerate the diffusion of 
products, innovations, and behaviors (Valente 1995; Watts and Dodds 2007). A 
growing body of literature in marketing and sociology has attempted to identify 
and test the role of influentials or opinion leaders. Some studies show that the 
opinion leaders, identified by self-reported measures, sociometric measures, and 
usage volume, tend to have a disproportionate influence on others’ adoptions 
(Iyengar et al. 2011; Nair et al. 2010; Weimann 1994). Iyengar et al. (2011) find 
that sociometric and self-reported measures of leadership are likely to capture 
different constructs and that heavy users are more influential. Nair et al. (2010) 
also use a sociometric approach to identify influentials and find asymmetric peer 
effects that opinion leaders exert a significant effect on other physicians, but not 
the other way around. Trusov et al. (2010) develop a methodology to identify 
influential users based on their activity level in online social networks and show 
significant heterogeneity in the level of influence among users. Aral and Walker 
(2012), using a randomized experiment on Facebook, further separate influence 
from susceptibility. In constrast, a small body of literature has recently questioned 






(2007) find that influence is not a key driver for peer effects. Also, Godes and 
Mayzlin (2009) show that heavy users are likely to be less effective sources of 
influence for low-risk products.  
However, there has been no substantive research on the role of opinion 
leaders in financial markets. Furthermore, even the small body of literature 
examining the role of influential entities often assumes that big investment banks, 
experienced venture capitals, and top-rank mutual funders are influential and 
examines whether investees report superior subsequent performance or whether 
these investees outperform the market (Barber et al. 2001; Hogan 1997; 
McLaughlin et al. 2000; Nahata 2008). However, there is, to the best of our 
knowledge, little research that has empirically examined the influence of opinion 
leaders in financial markets. This is in part related to the lack of detailed 
individual-level data in financial markets. This study attempts to fill this gap by 
identifying two types of reputable investors, and examining their investment 
decisions and their effects on subsequent investors.        
Our study also builds on the literature on signaling (Akerlof 1970; Spence 
1973). The signaling literature suggests that a high information asymmetry 
between sellers and buyers has a potential to lead to a “lemons” market and 
eventually, a market failure. Consequently, credible quality disclosure 
mechanisms from sellers and third parties are necessary to make such markets 
work (Dranove and Jin 2010). The literature further observes that a signal is more 
effective when the cost of acquiring it is greater (Spence 2002). Thus when 






credible. A stream of literature has looked at direct quality disclosure by sellers 
and empirically shown that sellers with better signals are associated with better 
outcomes. Specifically, several studies have focused on signaling by 
entrepreneurial firms  and the outcomes of the such signaling (Ahlers et al. 2012; 
Conti et al. 2013; Cosh et al. 2009; Hsu and Ziedonis 2013; Lin et al. 2013; 
Michael 2009). These studies suggest that better quality signals help 
entrepreneurial firms to obtain funding. A growing body of research has also 
focused on signals from third parties and buyers to examine their effect on 
individual behaviors and outcomes (Dranove and Jin 2010; Stuart et al. 1999). 
Our paper is closely related to this stream of research. Our study examines the 
value of the quality signals coming from informed investors rather than from the 
entrepreneurs themselves. In the context of entrepreneurial finance, several 
studies have shown that the endorsement by high-status investors can lead to 
performance benefits of invested startups (Hsu 2004; Meggison and Weiss 1991; 
Nahata 2008). However, there is little research about how investors’ responses to 
these quality signals depend on the source of these signals. Our study contributes 
to this stream of research by highlighting two distinct sources of quality signals 
from experts and their differential effects on subsequent investors.      
Our study is also related to the literature on herding behavior – especially, 
studies focusing on the mechanism of observational learning in financial markets. 
The concept of herding encompasses many mechanisms through which 
individuals may be influenced by other individuals. In particular, it includes two 






learning) and the mechanism based on payoff externalities.
6
 There is an extensive 
literature on observational learning starting with the seminal works of Banerjee 
(1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992). A body of literature shows that 
observational learning can explain a large variety of social behaviors such as 
consumer demand, technology adoption, and kidney transplantation (Conley and 
Udry 2010; Moretti 2011; Nanda and Sørensen 2010; Salganik et al. 2006; Zhang 
2010).
7
 For instance, several studies find that popularity information affects 
consumers’ behavior in an e-commerce context (Tucker and Zhang 2011) and in 
the context of restaurants (Cai et al. 2009).  
Reflecting the difficulty of identifying observational learning in non-
experimental settings, another stream of research uses experiments to examine 
herding. Through field experiments with market professionals, Alevy et al. (2007) 
find that, because of their ability to better discern the quality of public signals, 
professionals are less likely to be involved in overall cascades than students. In a 
laboratory setting, Cipriani and Guarino (2005) find that herding rarely occurs 
when the price is flexible. However, due to lack of individual investment data in 
financial markets, there have been very few studies attempting to identify 
observational learning in financial markets, especially at the individual level. Our 
study complements recent empirical studies with detailed data showing 
information-based herding in emerging online financial platforms such as peer-to-
peer lending markets (Zhang and Liu 2012) and crowdfunding markets (Agrawal 
et al. 2011).  
                                                 
6
 Herding may also arise through such means as preferences for conformity and sanctions.  
7







Payoff externalities may also be responsible for herding.  Positive 
externalities are common in the case of technologies and software. On the other 
hand, bank runs involve negative payoff externalities in which withdrawal by one 
depositor reduces the expected payoffs of others (Hirshleifer and Hong Teoh 
2003). Negative payoff externalities may also be caused by overcrowding (e.g., in 
restaurants where one’s utility decreases with the number of predecessors in the 
same restaurant).
8
 Thus, it is important to address both mechanisms when 
empirically measuring herding effects in certain contexts (Zhang and Liu 2012). 
Our study, in examining the effect of reputable investors on subsequent investors, 
controls for both possibilities. Nevertheless, it is pertinent to note that our primary 
focus is not on identifying herding behavior, but on measuring the influence of 
experts on subsequent investments, after controlling for average herding. 
Lastly, our study adds to the emerging research on online crowdfunding 
platforms. In one of the early studies on online crowdfunding, Lin et al (2013) 
find that a borrower’s social network can serve as a credible signal of quality to 
potential investors.  Subsequent studies have also examined the role of social 
influence in a number of online crowd-based markets including donation-based 
markets (Burtch et al. 2013), reward-based markets (Kuppuswamy and Bayus  
2013), and lending-based markets (Zhang and Liu 2012). Researchers have also 
begun to examine the role of location and geography on outcomes in crowd-
funding markets (Agrawal et al. 2011; Kim and Hann 2013; Lin and Viswanathan 
2013). There has also been an increasing interest in understanding equity-based 
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crowdfunding markets (Agrawal et al. 2013a; Stemler 2013). For instance, Ahlers 
et al. (2012) examine the role of different factors in signaling quality in equity-
based crowdfunding markets. Our study adds to this nascent but rapidly growing 
stream of research by examining the role of experts and more importantly the 
differential role of expertise in signaling the quality of investments to the crowd.  
2.3 Research Context and Data  
Our data comes from Appbackr, a crowdfunding marketplace for mobile 
applications that started operations in October 2010. Since then, it has provided a 
market where developers of mobile apps can list their apps to obtain funding from 
potential investors. Compared to other crowdfunding markets that host a variety 
of different projects, Appbackr focuses on mobile apps and has attracted a 
considerable number of mobile app developers and investors. By June 2013, 
Appbackr has attracted around 396 app developers listing 532 mobile apps and 
over 1,116 members investing around $1,030,000 in total.
9
  
Listing and investing on Appbackr proceed as follows. An app developer 
seeking funding for her app can post her listing - either a “concept app” that is not 
yet available for sale, or a “live app” that is available for sale in a mobile app 
store – for potential investors. The listing specifies the maximum amount of 
funding she seeks, the minimum amount that must be raised before she receives 
the fund (called ‘reserve’), and the duration for which the listing will remain 
active. The app developer also includes a written statement providing a brief 
description of her app, why the app should be backed, and what the funds will be 
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used for. App developers typically use the money for development and/or 
promotion.  
An investor decides whether to fund an app and if so, how much to 
contribute and when. The timing of investment is important for the investor in this 
“first-come-first-served” market, since investors get paid in the sequence they 
invest in an app. For example, an investor who is the first to fund 10,000 copies of 
the app at Appbackr, profits when the first 10,000 copies of the app are 
downloaded in the app store. After all 10,000 copies have been downloaded, the 
next investor profits. This makes early investors more likely to get paid than later 
investors.  
The return on investments on Appbackr depends on whether the app is a 
concept or a live app. Suppose that an investor wants to invest in a live app that is 
available for sale in the Apple app store for $0.99. The investor funds a copy of 
the app for $ 0.45. After Appbackr takes a commission of $0.10 for each copy 
sold, it transfers the rest, $0.35, to the app developer listing the app. When the app 
later gets sold on the app store, Appbackr receives $0.70 (after Apple’s 
commission of 30%), and retains $0.03 as its commission. Appbackr distributes 
the rest, with $0.57 going to the investors, and $0.10 going to the app developer. 
Thus, an investor gets a fixed return of 27% when the app is sold successfully. 
However, it is possible that the app does not sell well enough to cover the 
investment. Similarly, investors get a return of 54% for concept apps. If an app 
listed on Appbackr does not get funded successfully (i.e., reserve not met), all 






Crowdfunders on this platform are likely to invest in the listed apps 
mainly for monetary incentives. On other crowdfunding platforms such as 
Kickstarter, crowdfunders are also likely to participate because of other non-
monetary motivations, including their desire to support socially oriented 
initiatives, preferential access to the creators, and early access to new projects 
(Agrawal et al. 2013a). However, these motivations, if any, are likely to be small 
for investors on our context. Also, since there is limited community activity on 
Appbackr, easier access to the app developers or recognition within the platform 
is not likely to be a major motivation for them. Lastly, early access to new 
products is not likely to be important, because what they get in return is not new 
apps, but monetary profits. Thus, non-monetary incentives are likely to be less 
important on our context. It is also worth noting that our main focus here is to 
examine the role of experts on subsequent investments by the crowd.           
We track all listings posted on Appbackr from October 2010 through June 
2013. The resulting sample contains 532 listings with 3,501 specific 
investments.
10
 For each listing, we collect a set of its attributes and gather 
information on its funding progression, including the amount of funding it has 
received and the number of backers. We dropped all listings that were live at the 
time of date collection to address potential biases that can arise from simply 
ignoring censored observations (Van den Bulte and Iyengar 2011).   
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Table 1 presents the summary statistics for all listings. In this sample, the 
average price is $3.64, ranging from $0 to $599.99.
11
 The minimum amount 
listings request ranges between $0 and $157,500, with an average of $3,980. The 
maximum amount for funding is from $45 to $350,000. On the other hand, the 
total amounts investors actually pledged to each project are between $0 and 
$101,249, with an average of $1,892. If we consider only successful projects, the 
average increases to $3,891. The number of backers ranges from 0 to 116, with an 
average of 6.15. Furthermore, our data suggest that concept apps comprising 42% 
of total apps attract more money and investors. An average concept app receives 
$2,795 from about 10 investors while an average live app gets $1,245 from over 3 
investors. As a result, the ratio of successfully funded apps is higher in concept 
apps (50%) than in live apps (44%).
12
 Finally, about 77% of the listed apps are 
Apple iOS apps, whereas about 62% comes from app development companies.
13
  
2.3.1 Investor Types and Timing of Investments 
Investors on Appbackr fall into three categories. We identify two 
categories of experts. The first category of experts is App Developer Investors. 
App Developer Investors are investors who have developed and listed at least one 
other app on Appbackr and are thus likely to have expertise about the product – 
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 Free apps with in-app purchases use $0.99 pricing structure to determine the price that an 
investor pays. For example, a $4.99 in-app purchase will pay back 5 backed copies.   
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 Our sample has about 8% of apps that meet their maximum funding amounts set initially.  
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 To determine whether an app developer belongs to an app development company or is an 
individual, we rely on multiple sources, such as profiles at Appbackr, developer information at app 
stores, and Google search. When it comes to the category of apps, game is the largest category 
taking around 40% of total apps, even though apps in our sample come from 20 different 







particularly about apps in the developmental stage. The second category of 
experts are experienced investors. Experienced investors are investors who have 
invested in prior apps listed on Appbackr, and are more likely to have expertise 
about the market performance of apps. Finally, the third category of investors - 
the crowd, are the others who are neither App Developers nor Experienced 
Investors.                   
Experts typically tend to focus on specific categories that reflect their 
expertise. For example, investors might invest only in apps in the game category 
and accumulate some expertise specific to gaming-related apps. To measure the 
extent to which she concentrates her investments on certain categories, we 
calculate investment concentration in a way similar to calculating the Herfindahl 
index used to measure industry concentration. The average investment 
concentration is 0.83 for App Developer Investors while it is 0.44 for Experienced 
Investors. Experienced investors tend to have a lower investment concentration, 
and are less likely to focus on specific categories.  
While early investors are more likely to get paid than later investors, they 
are also faced with greater uncertainties – particularly given the intense 
competition among mobile apps and their low success rate. However, an 
important aspect of the online crowdfunding market is the visibility of 
information about early investors and their investments, to later investors. Thus, 
while on the one hand later investors run the risk of not being able to recoup their 
investments, on the other, they benefit from being able to learn from earlier 






Given the existence of investors with different types of expertise, our 
study seeks to understand if there are significant differences in the investment 
behaviors of these investors. In particular, we seek to examine if experts are more 
likely to invest early as compared to the crowd. Further, if these experts indeed 
invest early, are their investments likely to serve as signals of quality for later 
investors, and if so, do the differences in their expertise matter? 
2.4 Empirical Analysis 
We begin by examining whether experts are more likely to invest early. 
We use hazard modeling as the main statistical approach to examine this question. 
We operationalize the time of adoption as the time of first investment, i.e., we 
consider only the first investment by an investor for a given app. We create a 
binary adoption indicator variable      that is set to zero if investor i has not 
invested by period t in list j and is set to one if he has. The discrete time hazard of 
investment is then modeled as  
                                        (1) 
where      is a row vector of covariates,   is a column vector of parameters to be 
estimated, and F is a cumulative distribution function (e.g., logistic or standard 
normal). Our model includes dummies for days to investment within a listing and 
thus has a flexible baseline hazard rate. For each app, the population of interest 
consists only of investors who will invest in the app at least once while it remains 
active. Thus, an every investor is at the “risk” of investing in the app. We include 
monthly dummies to capture the effect of any platform-wide shock, such as 






In addition, because each investor can invest in multiple apps over time, 
we might have to account for possible correlation between investments by the 
same investor across apps. This can happen if heterogeneity among investors is 
not completely explained by our observed covariates. If such unobserved 
heterogeneity exists and is temporally stable, then the occurrence of an investor’s 
subsequent investments will not be independent of prior investments. We address 
this in multiple ways. We first use standard errors clustered by investor. This 
enables us to account for the correlation within investor across time, in the error 
structure. We also include a flexible baseline hazard rate by including dummies 
for days to investment to provide a nonparametric control for duration 
dependence. This controls for much of the effects of possible unobserved 
heterogeneity in hazard models (Meyer 1990). Third, we include the number of 
investments made prior to the current investment as an additional control variable 
in some specifications (Willett and Singer 1995). This can dampen the 
dependency of the investment timing on an investor’s previous history. Lastly, we 
include a random individual-level hazard parameter in our hazard model and 
estimate the standard random-effects model.
14
   
As highlighted earlier, our primary focus is to examine the role of experts 
in this crowdfunding markets. We exploit the panel data to examine whether the 
two categories of experts influence later investors. To construct the panel data, we 
collect information about timing and amount of all investments in each listing and 
calculate time-variant variables on a daily basis. The base equation for testing the 
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effect of reputable investors on later investments is: 
                                            (2) 
    represents the amount of funding that listing j receives during its tth day. We 
denote the influence of App Developer Investors (Experienced Investors) in 
listing j from day 1 to day t as     and    , To operationalize the influence of both 
groups, we use an aggregate measure of influence at a day. The measure is the 
sum of cumulative amounts of investments in prior projects of existing App 
Developer Investors (Experienced Investors) investing in listing j at day t. This 
measure assumes that the influence of the two groups of investors is proportional 
to their past investments. This is consistent with prior studies using investment 
experience (Chemmanur et al. 2010; Hsu 2004) and age (Gompers 1996) as a 
proxy for venture capital reputation.  
Our independent variables only include time-varying listing attributes 
     , since we conduct a fixed-effects model to capture unobserved 
heterogeneity across listings. The time-varying listing attributes include three 
variables related to herding. The cumulative amount of funding at day t-1 is used 
as a measure of herding momentum investors at day t face. The cumulative 
amount reflects previous investors’ collective evaluations of a listing as 
manifested in their funding allocation decisions. We also include the cumulative 
number of investments as another measure of herding momentum.
15
 This is 
important in our case, because our sample faces both positive information 
externality and negative payoff externality. Including both measures will help us 
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account for both effects. Also, following Zhang and Liu (2012) we include the 
percentage of the amount requested by listing j that is left unfunded at the end of 




It is unlikely that we capture every source of heterogeneity across listings 
with our available variables. Thus, we control for unobserved listing 
heterogeneity by including listing fixed effects   . The identification assumption 
is that the unobservable listing heterogeneity is time invariant. Based on this 
assumption, we identify the effect of reputable investors using within-listing 
variations in the amount received each day, the sum of cumulative amount of 
existing App Developer Investors or Experienced Investors prior to current 
listing, and observable time-varying listing attributes in    . The effect of time-
invariant listing attributes such as price, reserve, and developer type, cannot be 
separately estimated from listing fixed effects because of the perfect multi-
collinearity between them, and thus we drop them in our analysis.  
Note that we are primarily interested in the role of reputable investors after 
controlling for peer effects. However, typical identification issues in the 
traditional peer effects literature are still likely to  be a concern (Manski 1993). To 
the extent that the influence of reputable investors and peer effects are correlated, 
it can affect our estimates of the influence of reputable investors. Furthermore, 
prior investments of reputable investors are likely to reflect their preferences and 
hence may be correlated with current investments of the crowd who share similar 
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Endogenous group formation (i.e., homophily) arises if an investor selects 
peers based on shared traits or preferences. If coinvestments in the same listing 
are more likely between similar investors, their investments could be correlated 
because of inherent similarities in their preferences rather than as a consequence 
of their interactions. This is often a key challenge in identifying true contagions 
from homophily-driven correlations (Aral et al. 2009). We address this issue in 
several ways. First, to the extent that homophily is driven by some listing-related 
factors, having listing fixed effects can account for this. For example, a reputable 
investor and an unsophisticated later investor could both prefer investing in a 
listing that has a professional video, thus making them make an investment in the 
same listing. If so, coinvestment among the two can be driven not by the reputable 
investor’s influence but by their similar preferences. This can be accounted for by 
including listing fixed effects. However, it is also possible that the two investors 
are similar in other dimensions that have nothing to do with listings, such as 
demography. We believe that this is likely to be less of a concern in our context 
where most investors release little information and are arm’s-length investors 
funding small portions of an app developer’s request. Moreover, there is little 
room for direct communication among investors during and after campaigns. 
Thus, it is unlikely that they make investments in the same listing due to shared 
traits that are unrelated to listings.  
Another concern is the existence of correlated unobservables that lead to 






correlation are marketing efforts directed at the listing and the change in ratings of 
live apps. We include time fixed effects to partly control for some variations in a 
project. Nonetheless, we acknowledge that this does not completely control for 
variations in some project characteristics over time, although the marketing effort 
is limited in the platform.  In addition, our setting mitigates a concern from any 
spatially correlated location-specific shocks to investment behaviors that may 
generate comovement in investments. Investors on our online platform are likely 
to be geographically dispersed and rarely likely to be located in similar regions. 
Thus, any co-movements in investments from location-specific shocks are less of 
a concern. Lastly, simultaneity is less of a concern in our context, since we do not 
examine contemporaneous influence between investors. Influence and peer effects 
are one-day lagged in our analysis.  
In addition to these, an important mechanism to identify the impact of an 
expert investor on the investment behaviors of subsequent investors is to examine 
the signaling role of “expertise”. More specifically, when an early investor’s 
expertise is visible to subsequent investors, her actions are likely to influence 
subsequent investors. However, when the crowd is unaware of an investor’s 
expertise (i.e. the crowd is unaware that the early investor is indeed an expert), the 
expert’s actions should not have a significant influence on subsequent investors. 
This serves as a valuable falsification test. Our data enables us to exploit this 
difference in information about expertise available to subsequent investors to help 
us identify the role of experts and their expertise in these markets.                          






whether herding driven by reputable investors is rational or not. If herding is 
rational, well-funded apps should indeed have more sales. To examine this, we 
use app sales data provided by xyo.net. Xyo provides estimated cumulated 
monthly sales data for an app or an app developer. We conduct several 
regressions of the number of cumulative downloads of apps listed at Appbackr on 
funding status at the app level. An obvious concern is lack of measures of the true 
quality of an app which drives both funding and sales. We include an app’s 
consumer rating as a proxy for its perceived quality.  
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 The Experts in the Crowd 
Table 2 presents the results of our analysis of the differences in investment 
behaviors by investor type. As noted earlier, App Developer Investors are 
investors with at least one app posted at Appbackr while Experienced Investors 
are investors having more than $2,000 in investments and at least 5 specific 
investments.
17
 In our sample, we have 67 App Developer Investors who made 168 
investments and 17 Experienced Investors with 213 investments. Experienced 
Investors are heavy investors investing an average of about $15,000. On the other 
hand, App Developer Investors are not as active, as compared to Experienced 
Investors. The typical App Developer Investor makes an investment of $330 with 
slightly less than 3 investments. Since most of App Developer Investors are not 
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heavy investors, our two categories of reputable investors are distinct from each 
other.  
Table 2 also provides some evidence of the investment timing of reputable 
investors. As shown in Table 2 both types of experts – App Developer Investors 
as well as Experienced Investors - are likely to invest earlier than the crowd. 
When we further divide the sample into concept and live apps, we still see the 
same pattern in each group. These findings are also confirmed by the survival 
estimates in Figures 1 and 2. The x axis represents the number of days since an 
app is listed. The y axis represents the cumulative proportion of investors who 
have not adopted. Y value is one at the start of the first day since no one has made 
any investment yet. As shown in the Figure 1 (panel A), the survival curve drops 
faster for experts, implying that both Experienced Investors and App Developer 
Investors are likely to invest earlier than the others. Furthermore, as shown in 
Figure 1 (panel B), we find that even among Experienced Investors, the more 
experienced investors tend to invest earlier than less experienced investors. When 
we divide the sample into concept and live apps, we still observe the same pattern 
in concept apps (see panel A of Figure 2). However, for live apps Experienced 
Investors are still early investors, whereas App Developer Investors look quite 
similar to the crowd in investment timing. Note that App Developer Investors still 
tend to invest slightly early in the first 20 days of live apps, as shown in panel B 
of Figure 2.  
Table 3 reports the estimates of the discrete-time hazard model relating to 






accounting for possible covariates. Column (2) shows that App developer 
Investors and Experienced Investors have a significant and positive effect, which 
confirms that these experts do invest early. This finding is robust when we add 
monthly dummies, as shown in column (3). Comparing columns (2) and (3) 
illustrates the importance of including monthly dummies. Our findings in column 
(3) suggest that controlling for app characteristics, the estimated odds of investing 
early are about 46% (76%) higher for App developer Investors (Experienced 
Investors), compared with the crowd. The Pseudo R
2
 statistic increases with 
monthly dummies and, as discussed above, including them also helps us to control 
for all cross-temporal variations in the mean tendency to invest.  
We further test whether our finding varies by the type of apps. As shown 
in columns (4)-(5), we find that the two types of reputable investors both invest 
early for concept apps, whereas only the experienced investors invest early for 
live apps, the finding consistent with Figure 2.
18
 This might suggest that App 
Developer Investors are more confident about investing in concept apps which are 
in the developmental stages, while Experienced Investors being active participants 
invest early in both types of apps. Lastly, we provide some evidence that our 
findings are robust even after accounting for investor heterogeneity (see column 
6).
19
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 The numbers of observations in columns (4) and (5) do not sum up to the number of 
observations in column (3), because some observations are dropped due to several dummies 
perfectly predicting success or failure.   
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 In unreported results, we also include the number of investments made prior to the current 
investment by a given investor as a proxy for her experience. Our main findings are qualitatively 
similar. Note that this variable is, by definition, highly correlated to experienced investors who 






2.5.2 The Role of Expertise 
We next examine whether both categories of experts have a 
disproportionate influence on the subsequent crowd. Table 4 reports the panel 
data model estimates with listing-specific fixed-effects. We first examine the 
investments of all subsequent investors. In column (1) both variables are 
positively associated with later investments after controlling for peer effects, even 
though the influence of app developers are likely to be greater. This indicates that 
both have some expertise and reputation in this market so later investors imitate 
their investment decisions. Furthermore, their influences differ with the type of 
apps. Columns (2)-(3) show that App Developer Investors are influential for both 
types of apps, while Experienced Investors are more influential for live apps – a 
likely reflection of the differences in their expertise. The R
2
 Statistic is higher in 
concept apps than in live apps. This may imply that the influence of peer investors 
including experts is stronger in concepts as compared with live apps.   
Since we are more interested in examining the influence of reputable 
investors on the subsequent crowd rather than on all investors, we next turn to 
findings that consider only the crowd in subsequent investors. The findings shown 
in columns (4)-(6) highlight the differential effects of App Developer Investors 
and Experienced Investors - a likely reflection of the differences in their expertise. 
App Developer Investors are influential only for concept apps, while Experienced 
Investors are influential only for live apps. This may reflect the fact that App 
Developer Investors are more likely to have expertise with respect to the creation 






expertise with respect to market dynamics including sales and performance of the 
product.  
The estimates from columns (5) and (6) allow us to evaluate the 
magnitude of influence. Column (5) suggests that, ceteris paribus, a 10% increase 
in prior cumulative investments by app developer investors is associated with a 
1.73% increase in investments for the app on the following day. In other words, if 
a listing’s App Developer Investors, on average, have an additional $33.0 (from 
the mean of $330.1) in prior investments, it will, on average, generate an 
additional $0.72 (=1.73%*$41.50) for the listing on the following day.
20
 
Similarly, a 10% increase in prior cumulative investments by an Experienced 
Investor, generates an additional $0.21 in investments for the focal app.  
We perform additional analyses to gain more insights into the source of 
influence of reputable investors and report results in Table 5. The influence of 
experts is likely to depend on their prior experience which in turn makes them a 
more credible source of information. Since the expertise of App Developer 
Investors is likely to come from their prior app development experiences, we first 
test whether App Developer Investors are more influential when they have at least 
a successfully funded app. Columns (1)-(3) of Table 5 show that the crowds’ 
investments are significantly influenced only by App Developer Investors with 
their own successfully funded apps and that this effect is stronger for concept 
apps.  
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the following day. Note that calculating the aggregate effect by the end of a listing’s duration is 






Furthermore, in columns (4)-(6) we decompose the influence measure for 
App Developer Investors into those in the same category and those in different 
categories to examine whether the expertise of App Developer Investors is 
category-specific. We expect that App Developer Investors should have a stronger 
influence on the crowd when they have a successfully funded app in the same 
category as the focal project they invest in. For instance, if an App Developer 
Investor has a successfully funded app in ‘game’ category, his influence as an 
investor should be stronger in that category. Our findings suggest that the 
expertise of App Developer Investors is somewhat category-specific, although 
statistically weak. We find that App Developer Investors have a stronger 
influence on the crowd when they make an investment in a category where they 
have their own successfully funded apps. This more nuanced finding further 
corroborates the credibility based claim.  
As noted earlier, an important falsification test is the visibility (or lack 
thereof) of an expert investor’s expertise. In other words, when subsequent 
investors are unaware of the expertise of an early investor, they are unlikely to be 
influenced by the specific investor’s investment decisions. To examine this, we 
exploit informational variation in our dataset wherein some App Developer 
Investors invest in apps before their own app is listed in this marketplace. It is 
pertinent to note that all App Developer Investors eventually have their own apps 
listed on the platform. However, some App Developer Investors participate in the 
platform as an investor before listing their own apps. It is possible that some of 






Without prior knowledge of the identity of these App Developers, it is very costly 
for the crowd to verify the expertise of these otherwise anonymous investors. 
However, when an App Developer has listed her own apps on Appbackr, her 
investments in other apps are made under the same “profile name” as her own 
listing, making it easier for subsequent investors to gather information about her 
related expertise. In examining the impact of these anonymous App Developers 
on the crowd, we find that these potential App Developers do not have a 
significant influence on the investment decisions of the crowd (see Columns 7 – 
9).  This indicates that the credibility of an App Developer’s investments as a 
quality signal crucially depends on the ability of the crowd to verify her expertise. 
For Experienced Investors, their expertise, if any, is likely to come from 
their prior investments. In this regard, they are likely to learn more from prior 
investments in successfully funded apps, as they get monthly updates about those 
apps and may be more active in promoting them. Thus, we expect that investing 
in successfully funded apps makes Experienced Investors more influential than 
investing in unsuccessfully funded ones. Columns (10)-(12) of Table 5 show that 
investments by Experienced Investors in successfully funded apps are 
significantly associated with later investments by the crowd than those in 
unsuccessfully funded. This implies that their prior investments in successfully 
funded apps are perceived as a more credible source of influence. Furthermore, 
unreported analyses indicate that the “expertise” of Experienced Investors is less 
likely to be category specific. As compared to App Developer Investors, 






apps regardless of which category they belong to and their experience regardless 
of the category serves as a credible signal for later investors. The investment 
concentration shown in Table 2 highlights this. It is pertinent to note that the total 
investments and unrelated investments for Experienced Investors are highly 
correlated, since a significant share of investments are unrelated investments.  
Until now our influence measures assume that the influence of the experts 
is a function of their prior investments. While it is likely to be reasonable for 
Experienced Investors, it might not be a reasonable assumption for App 
Developer Investors. Their influence is likely to come from their prior app 
developer experience, not from their prior investments. Thus, we also use an un-
weighted measure of influence of App Developer Investors, which is the number 
of existing App Developer Investors. This measure assumes that each App 
Developer Investor has the same level of influence regardless of their prior 
investment. Table 6 shows results with this measure. Note that we use the same 
measure for Experienced Investors as in our main model. Table 6 suggests that 
our main findings do not change qualitatively. This further reinforces the assertion 
that the influence of App Developer Investors derives mainly from their prior app 
development experience.    
2.5.3 The Credibility of Experts: An Analysis of Ex Post Performance 
We then examine the performance effects of crowdfunding investments. 
Our study of Appbackr for mobile applications benefits from the opportunity to 
measure the quality of listings as revealed by subsequent app performance. To 






xyo.net, which reports the cumulative and current monthly estimated sales for 
apps in Apple and Android app stores.
21
 Among 551 apps in our sample, we 
obtain cumulative sales data for 376 apps. We conduct an OLS regression of the 
cumulative number of downloads on app- and app developer-specific 
characteristics.  
Column (1) of Table 7 reports the relationship between the amount of 
funding and total app sales. As expected, the relationship is significantly positive. 
We add app-specific characteristics in column (2). We still see a significant and 
positive association between total funding and total app sales, implying that well-
funded apps are likely to have better sales after controlling for observable app 
attributes. This finding is robust when we add an app developer attribute- global 
rank.
22
 The coefficient in column (3) suggests that for 1% increase in funding on 
Appbackr, the number of downloads increases on average by 0.15%. Global rank 
at xyo represents the performance of app developers in terms of their recent sales. 
The lower the global rank, the better the app developer. We then include an app’s 
consumer rating as a proxy for its perceived quality. The positive relationship 
could be driven by both the selection effect and the causal effect. In other words, 
experts can be good at selecting better apps in the first place. However, 
crowdfunding may also causally lead to better apps because investors may help 
promote the apps they are investing in, for example, by sharing them on their 
social networking pages. Also, investors, especially App Developer Investors, 
may provide other app developers with some tips about product development. It is 
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 Xyo stopped providing this measure on Mar 2013. Thus, when we add this variable, we lose 






challenging to separate out the two effects.  However, to the extent that an app’s 
consumer rating is a good proxy for its quality, the reduction in the coefficients 
for the success of funding after including the consumer rating indicates that there 
exist some levels of selection effects. Comparing column (3) with column (5), we 
find the coefficient for the total funding is lower. This suggests that the experts on 
Appbackr indeed have expertise in selecting better apps in the first place. Thus 
their early investments serve as a credible signal of quality to the subsequent 
crowd. In addition, when we compare the raw ex-post sales between apps with 
investments by experts and those without, we find that apps with investments 
from experts, especially App Developer Investors, have more sales, further 
indicating the credibility of their expertise.
23
 We then examine whether the 
relationship varies with type of apps and find little difference between concept 
and live apps.  
2.5.4 Robustness Checks 
Addressing Endogeneity Concern from Serial Correlation  
 
Our identification strategy for Equation (2) assumes that the error terms 
are not correlated across time. Under this assumption, our key independent 
variables are contemporaneously uncorrelated with the error terms, although they 
may be correlated with past shocks. However, if the error terms are serially 
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those with experienced investors, 61,153 for those with only the crowd, 11,422 for those apps 










We assume that the unobserved error terms consist of a first-order 
autoregressive component with parameter   and a random component,    . In 
other words,               . Thus, the updated model is   
                                              (3) 
A serial correlation adjustment allows us to remove the autocorrelation 
effect      , thereby leaving us with only the contemporaneous shock.  
                                                     
                                (4) 
After estimating   with fixed-effect estimation for Equation (4), we 
construct a new dataset with variables that are corrected for serial correlation and 
conduct the fixed-effect estimation with the new dataset. Columns (1)-(3) of 
Table 8 show that our main findings do not change qualitatively even after rho-
differencing to remove serial correlation.    
We can also address this concern in the dynamic GMM framework. The 
idea of dynamic GMM is to use lagged independent variables as instruments in 
the first-differenced model by assuming an orthogonal relationship between the 
instrumental variables and residuals in the first-difference model. This approach 
allows us to statistically test whether the instruments satisfy exclusion restrictions. 
We conducted the dynamic GMM regressions with multiple lagged levels as 
instruments and report the estimation results in columns (4)-(6) in Table 8. The 
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results are qualitatively similar to those from fixed-effects models. App 
Developer Investors are influential mostly for concept apps, whereas Experienced 
Investors for live apps. We checked the validity of the moment conditions 
required by system GMM using the Hansen test for exogeneity of our instruments 
(Blundell and Bond 1998, Roodman 2009). 
Potential for Collusion 
 
Since a listing with App Developer Investors will attract more money 
from subsequent investors, app developers might collude among themselves by 
exchanging investment favors. In such a case, signals from app developers can 
lead to sub-optimal results. We do not find evidence for this in our context. First, 
the suggestive evidence of rational herding driven by app developers dampens 
this concern, since low quality app developers are more likely to participate in 
collusion, if any, thus making well-funded apps have lower sales ex-post. Second, 
in our sample there are only two instances where app developers mutually invest 
in each other’s app. Lastly, in examining which app developers are more likely to 
be investors, we find that the only significant factor is the quality of the app 
developers. High quality app developers are more likely to invest in other apps. 
This suggests that investing in other apps is unlikely to derive from a need for 
reciprocity. 
Fixed Effects Poisson 
 
Since the daily amount that a listing receives cannot be negative and not 
all listings get funded on a given day, we also estimate a fixed effects Poisson 






the daily amount of funding (in dollars) in each listing can be drawn from a 
different Poisson distribution. In unreported results, we find that our main 
findings are robust. 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we study investors’ behaviors in an online crowdfunding 
market for mobile apps. We show that early investments by experts serve as 
credible signals of quality for later investors, especially for those who are less 
experienced. More importantly, the value of these signals depends on the nature 
of their expertise. In particular, early investments by App Developer Investors are 
more influential for concept apps, while Experienced Investors are more 
influential for live apps. Furthermore, we find that App Developer Investors are 
more influential when they have successfully funded apps, especially in the 
category where they make an investment, while the experience of Experienced 
Investors determines the strength of their influence. These present a clear 
contingency argument in the effectiveness of quality signals for investors – 
quality signals may be credible only if senders possess related expertise and 
experience. Last, we find that well-funded apps are more likely to have better 
sales ex-post.  
The findings of our study have a number of interesting implications. As 
highlighted earlier, investors in crowdfunding markets are faced with significant 
information asymmetries. Given the lack of traditional quality assurance 
mechanisms, it is interesting to examine how individual investors that comprise 






find that despite the crowd lacking the sophistication and expertise of traditional 
investors such as financial institutions, VCs, etc., the crowd is not only able to 
leverage the information contained in early investments by expert investors, but 
also identify and exploit nuanced differences between different signals within the 
same market.   
Our study also sheds light on an important role played by experts in 
crowdfunding markets. While it is well known that experts play an important and 
prominent role in traditional financial markets, online crowdfunding is often 
considered to be largely driven by the crowd of anonymous participants. While 
the crowd constitutes the vast majority of the investors in online crowdfunding 
markets, we find that experts, although few in number, play a disproportionate 
role in influencing the behavior of investors in these markets. 
In examining the role of experts in a crowdfunding markets, our study also 
contributes to research on opinion leadership. Our empirical evidence indicates 
that product expertise is an overlooked dimension of opinion leadership that is 
quite different from another measure, investment experience (i.e., usage volume), 
which has been used rather frequently. Furthermore, our finding on credibility of 
product experts complements recent studies showing that opinion leadership is 
related to the stage of the product life cycle (Godes and Mayzlin 2009; Iyengar et 
al. 2011; Susarla et al. 2012). Our finding extends the literature by showing that, 
in a nascent crowdfunding market, product experts might be at least as credible as 






With respect to policy implications, our findings indicate that the 
crowdfunding market works in a largely rational manner. This is particularly 
impressive since investors in the crowdfunding market are arguably less 
sophisticated. Crowdfunding investors appear to pay much attention to credible 
sources of quality and discern more credible signals by looking at expertise and 
experience of senders. Thus, as long as the crowdfunding market provides a 
sufficient amount of information about investors and products, potential risks in 
crowdfunding that some regulators are concerned about might be significantly 
mitigated. 
Finally, our study also has implications for the design on online 
crowdfunding markets. While it is feasible for a potential investor to obtain 
information on early investors and their investments, our findings suggest that 
providing more sophisticated search tools that facilitate seamless access to such 
information might be crucial for these markets, particularly in their nascent 
stages. However, it is also important for regulators to pay attention to the potential 
for misuse in the longer run. Our data does not find any evidence of fraud among 
project owners. Nonetheless, if the cost of quality signaling is small, an improved 
understanding of this dynamic could lead to its misuse. Future studies could 
examine the evolutionary dynamics of these markets. Furthermore, as in many 
other online platforms, in crowdfunding platforms reputation-building systems for 
both investors and project owners would be particularly important in the long 






CHAPTER 3: CROWDFUNDING AND THE 




One aspect of crowdfunding that has garnered large interest of late is the ability of 
crowdfunding to ‘democratize’ access to capital. Entrepreneurs initiating 
crowdfunded projects, located anywhere, are able to access sources of capital 
from anywhere. As such, entrepreneurs who face less attractive credit 
environments may on the margin choose to engage in crowdfunding. Similarly, 
projects in geographically less populated areas may benefit from crowdfunding. 
In this paper, we examine how geography affects the formation of crowdfunded 
projects. We collected data on housing prices and local credit markets that are 
closely related to the cost of accessing traditional sources of credit and matched 
these data to a novel data set from a leading crowdfunding market. We find that 
small cities appear to get a disproportionate benefit from crowdfunding. Our 
findings also show that difficult access to credit from local banks induces 
entrepreneurs to rely more on crowdfunding. Moreover, tighter credit constraints 
due to a drop in housing prices have a stronger effect on entrepreneurs who 
initiate large projects and live in high income areas. The impact of a local credit 
market structure is almost entirely via ‘location-independent’ projects that attract 
less funding from local people. Overall, we provide evidence that web-enabled 
crowdfunding has the potential to democratize access to capital in that it can be a 
viable option for entrepreneurs having difficulty accessing traditional offline 







In a knowledge-based economy, economic prosperity and job creation 
rests on its ability to foster innovation. Innovation leads to new products, 
production processes, intellectual property and industries. One of the main drivers 
of innovation is access to capital. Traditionally, private individuals, banks, and 
venture capital funds have supported high-risk projects through loans or 
investments. Previous studies have shown that these investments often target few 
industries and/or have a very narrow geographic scope (Petersen and Rajan 2002; 
Sorenson and Stuart 2001).  
The proliferation of Internet based platforms has created an additional 
channel of capital – crowdfunding. In these markets, an individual requests 
funding for an idea and a large number of unaffiliated individuals contribute to 
fund the project. Crowdfunded projects range from small creative projects to 
social and entrepreneurial ventures seeking millions of dollars in capital. The 
crowdfunding marketplaces have grown rapidly in recent years, attracting an 
estimated $5.1 billion worldwide in 2013.
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 Kickstarter, one of the leading online 




This massive growth has received enormous attention from policy makers. 
Until now, if funders of Kickstarter projects were to earn a return on their money, 
they would be subject to federal and state laws governing the sale of securities. 
The Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act in the United States (US) allows 










an exemption to this rule. It makes it easier for ordinary investors to participate in 
entrepreneurial ventures that were up-to-now only reserved to sophisticated 
investors. When signing the JOBS Act in April 2012, President Obama 
announced that “Startups and small businesses will be allowed to raise up to $1 
million annually from many small-dollar investors through web-based platforms, 
democratizing access to capital”.
27
 This democratization of access to capital has 
attracted even greater attention in recent economic downturns. The recent 
financial crisis and economic downturns have led to a significant reduction in the 
availability of capital and credit, especially for cash-strapped individuals and 
small businesses (Greenstone and Mas 2012; Laderman and Reid 2010). As a 
consequence, providing small businesses with needed capital has been more 
crucial and crowdfunding has been viewed as a viable alternative for raising 
capital.   
However, academic research on crowdfunding has largely neglected this 
important question of whether and how crowdfunding helps in democratizing 
access to capital. What would the democratization of access to capital look like? 
We could say that crowdfunding contributes to democratizing access to capital if 
it provides a new channel of capital to entrepreneurs who have promising ideas 
but are difficult to raise money from conventional funding sources. Entrepreneurs 
may get financially disadvantaged because of several factors such as their race, 
education, and social groups. In this paper, we are focusing on geography, since 
the literature suggests that geography is playing a significant role in determining 









access to capital and credit from conventional funding sources (Kerr and Nanda 
2011). Furthermore, geography is a right dimension to investigate, because online 
crowdfunding markets are believed to reduce geographical constraints on funding 
which are often shown in conventional funding sources (Agrawal et al. 2011; 
Petersen and Rajan 2002; Sorenson and Stuart 2001). Obviously, the role of 
geography in accessing capital and credit can take different forms. Projects in 
small cities may have lower odds of being funded. Similarly, local market 
conditions may lower the availability of credit to individuals and thus limit the 
feasibility of their ventures. In addition, not all projects and entrepreneurs may 
benefit equally from crowdfunding as an alternative source of capital. In this 
endeavor, this paper examines conditions under which such venture activities 
benefit more from online crowdfunding markets as an alternative source of 
financing. Specifically, we ask the following three questions: 1) What is the 
geographic distribution of crowdfunded projects between small and large cities? 
2) How does the availability and cost of traditional sources of financing influence 
the propensity to use crowdfunding? 3) What variables moderate the decision to 
seek crowdfunding over traditional financing?                  
Little is known regarding the factors that contribute to the initiation of 
crowdfunded projects. However, previous literature on entrepreneurship suggests 
that access to capital and credit is a primary factor in spurring entrepreneurship 
(Combes and Duranton 2006; Samila and Sorenson 2011). Previous work has 
shown that household wealth is vital for the creation of new businesses (Evans 






which represents the bulk of household wealth, has been shown to ease credit 
constraints for entrepreneurs and thereby boost entrepreneurship (Fairlie and 
Krashinsky 2012; Fan and White 2003). Following prior literature (Adelino et al. 
2013; Mian and Sufi 2011), we focus on housing prices as a proxy for credit 
availability for entrepreneurs. We expect that housing price decline during the 
recent economic downturn has driven entrepreneurs facing tough credit 
constraints to seek alternative sources of financing such as crowdfunding.
28
 We 
also examine the number of banks in a local market that can affect the cost of 
accessing credit from traditional sources (Guiso et al. 2004). It is well known that 
small business lending often relies on “soft” information, which would be 
collected through long-term relationships with borrowers (Petersen and Rajan 
2002). As such, geographical proximity should matter in this kind of lending. 
Thus, when entrepreneurs live farther from their local banks, they are likely to 
pay higher (monetary and non-monetary) costs for funding projects, thus making 
them use crowdfunding more.          
This paper studies the research questions in the context of an online 
crowdfunding market. The data for this study was collected from Kickstarter, one 
of the leading online crowdfunding marketplaces. Since its beginning in April 
2009, Kickstarter has emerged as the major online crowdfunding marketplace for 
entrepreneurs initiating various projects, especially creative projects. We collected 
data on Kickstarter projects from April 2009 through January 2013; overall, we 
gathered data on 70,654 projects that have attracted more than $450 million in 
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pledges from about 2.47 million contributors. We use the term of entrepreneurs to 
refer to project creators on Kickstarter. The entrepreneurs on this market include 
musicians, film makers, dancers, game developers, and hardware product 
developers, most of whom are different from technologically innovative 
entrepreneurs that many people typically have in mind. 
We investigate whether we can find support for the notion that 
crowdfunding ‘democratizes’ access to capital and if so, how. In order to do this, 
we first report the geographical distribution of crowdfunded projects. We then 
examine whether entrepreneurs with limited access to traditional sources of 
financing have a higher propensity to use crowdfunding. In order to identify the 
causal effect of the credit availability proxied by housing prices we instrument for 
the change in housing prices between 2009 and 2012 using the measure of 
housing supply elasticity developed by Saiz (2010), which exploits exogenous 
geographical and regulatory restrictions on housing supply. Next, we investigate 
whether this effect varies across different cities with a particular attention paid to 
income differences. Third, we examine whether this effect varies across 
categories. We focus on two major category characteristics- the share of local 
contributions and the average project size. Last, we conduct several robustness 
tests to rule out alternative explanations.      
We find that small cities appear to get a benefit from crowdfunding that is 
disproportionate to that which they receive from traditional means: compared to 
venture capital investments, smaller cities get disproportionately more projects 






due to housing price decline or fewer banks in a market increase the use of 
crowdfunding. This is consistent with the notion that crowdfunding is serving as 
an alternative to traditional sources of financing. We further observe that the 
effect of a decline in housing prices on crowdfunding is stronger for categories 
that require larger funding, confirming that our main finding is driven by the 
collateral effect. Next, we find that the effect of changing housing prices is 
significant mainly for high income (and high education) Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas (MSAs). This implies that crowdfunding will be helpful mainly for 
entrepreneurs who are facing a temporary credit shock because of a drop in 
housing prices but have a certain level of skills and wealth. Finally, we see that 
the impact of competition among local banks is almost entirely via ‘location-
independent’ projects that attract less from local people.      
This study makes several significant contributions to the relevant 
literature. First, our study is the first to show systematic evidence of a significant 
relationship between local credit conditions and the use of crowdfunding in the 
local region. In this regard, our study complements recent empirical studies 
shedding light on the importance of geography in the context of crowdfunding 
(Agrawal et al. 2011; Lin and Viswanathan 2013; Mollick 2012). Second, our 
paper contributes to a body of empirical literature on the consumer substitution 
between online and offline channels (Anderson et al. 2010; Brynjolfsson et al. 
2009; Choi and Bell 2011; Ellison and Ellison 2009; Forman et al. 2009; Ghose et 
al. 2012; Goolsbee 2000, 2001; Langer et al. 2012). Most of this prior work 






financial products. Our paper explores how local credit market conditions affect 
the propensity of entrepreneurs to use web-based crowdfunding. Third, our study 
advances a small body of literature showing that the geographical distance in 
online transactions matters more for certain products (Blum and Goldfarb 2006; 
Brynjolfsson et al. 2009; Hortacsu et al. 2009; Sinai and Waldfogel 2004). We not 
only report significant variation in contribution patterns across categories, but also 
provide evidence that this can affect behaviors of market participants in 
crowdfunding. Finally, and more broadly, this study extends the growing body of 
literature that examines how IT-mediated online platforms contribute to consumer 
welfare. The literature has shown how online platforms benefit consumers with 
increased product variety (Brynjolfsson et al. 2003), lower transaction costs 
(Overby and Jap 2009), lower prices (Baye et al. 2006), more liquid markets for 
information goods (Ghose et al. 2006), higher price elasticity (Granados et al. 
2012) and better information about product quality (Mudambi and Schuff 2010). 
We contribute to this literature by showing that online crowdfunding platforms 
have the potential to democratize access to capital.   
3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Crowdfunding 
A growing body of literature has examined the concept of online 
crowdfunding platforms. In general, crowdfunding platforms differ in terms of the 
funder’s primary motivation. Funders participate in expectation of some sort of 






or tangible, but non-financial, benefits (e.g., in Kickstarter) for their financial 
contributions. Market participants are expected to behave differently depending 
on different types of incentives (Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2013). Existing work on 
crowdfunding has provided conceptual and legal analysis (Belleflamme et al. 
2010; Schwienbacher and Larralde 2010). For example, Agrawal et al. (2013b) 
provide a good overview of the economics of crowdfunding, especially 
crowdfunding for equity, which is often called equity-based crowdfunding. They 
consider crowdfunding as a puzzling market, since funders appear to make 
contributions in the market with high levels of information asymmetry and risks 
without practicing careful due diligence. They describe incentives of all 
participants in crowdfunding (i.e., creators, funders, and platforms) and discuss 
market mechanisms that may be effective in reducing potential market failures.  
A small body of literature has provided empirical evidence of the behavior 
of market participants in different crowdfunding markets. Social influence among 
funders has been the most examined factor in the literature. This topic has been 
examined in donation-based markets (Burtch et al. 2013), reward-based markets 
(Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2013), revenue sharing-based markets (Agrawal et al. 
2011), and lending-based markets (Lin et al. 2013; Zhang and Liu 2012). 
Altogether, the literature shows that social influence does matter for crowdfunders 
but the direction of the influence varies depending on the funders’ incentives. 
Agrawal et al. (2011) further examined the role of geography in contribution 
patterns and suggested a reduced role for geographical proximity. Lin and 






based market, showing there is still a significant “home bias” in the market. 
Though an increasing body of literature has been examining crowdfunding 
markets, almost all the studies have focused mainly on crowdfunders. Thus, we 
know little about what drives entrepreneurs to use crowdfunding. Specifically, 
whether and how geography affects the incentive of entrepreneurs to use 
crowdfunding are important issues but have remained unknown so far. Our study 
attempts to fill this gap. 
3.2.2 Geography and Entrepreneurship 
Since creating a crowdfunded project can be thought of as a new form of 
entrepreneurship, our study also relies on the literature on entrepreneurship, 
especially examining the role of geography in entrepreneurship. The existing 
literature offers several explanations on why entrepreneurship differs by 
geography. The first explanation focuses on the supply of potential entrepreneurs. 
This theory suggests that the level of initial human capital base in an area affects 
the entrepreneurial rate in the area. A second explanation highlights the 
importance of a large customer base. Entrepreneurs may start businesses to cater 
to this customer base (Glaeser 2007). Customers may also play a role in providing 
capital and investment support to certain projects (Ordanini et al. 2011). This is 
particularly plausible for our context. Many consumers who are really enthusiastic 
about a project are likely to become crowdfunders, who contribute a small amount 
of money to the project. The ability of some areas to foster new ideas is another 
potential reason why they become hubs of entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurial ideas 






1982). Hence, the presence of suppliers of ideas can spur entrepreneurship by 
facilitating the creation of new ideas and the transfer of existing ones. A fourth 
view points to a local culture of entrepreneurship as a key determinant. Some 
regions may simply have a strong culture of entrepreneurship, while others may 
just follow tradition and old social norms. This implies that positive social 
spillovers from entrepreneurship may generate significant variation across regions 
(Glaeser and Kerr 2009).        
Entrepreneurship is also likely to be driven by the presence of suitable 
input suppliers. One of the most important inputs into entrepreneurship is access 
to capital and credit (Kerr and Nanda 2011). A large portion of small businesses 
uses some form of credit such as small business loans, credit card loans, home 
equity loans and traditional bank loans (Laderman and Reid 2010). This is often 
because credit constraints at the household level matter to individual 
entrepreneurs (Evans and Jovanovic 1989; Holtz-Eakin et al. 1994; Hurst and 
Lusardi 2004). Evans and Jovanovic (1989) show that due to liquidity constraints, 
there is a positive relationship between household wealth and the propensity of 
starting a new business. Furthermore, Hurst and Lusardi (2004) show that a 
positive relationship between household wealth and the propensity of becoming 
self-employed is found only for households in the top 5% of the wealth 
distribution. In particular, housing wealth has been shown to ease credit 
constraints for entrepreneurs and thereby become a primary factor for financing 






Krashinsky 2012; Fan and White 2003). Thus, it is likely that when housing 
prices are going down, entrepreneurs will face tighter credit constraints.         
Even though access to credit matters to entrepreneurs, it is not clear 
whether local sources of financing are needed for local entrepreneurship. Local 
banks are likely to matter only when entrepreneurs prefer borrowing money from 
their local banks (Guiso et al. 2004). A stream of literature shows that distance 
still matters to small business lending, although technology weakens the 
dependence of small businesses on local lenders (Brevoort et al. 2010; Petersen 
and Rajan 2002). This is mainly because small business lending often requires 
collecting “soft” information about small businesses over time through 
relationships with those firms, making local presence critical. Amel and Brevoot 
(2005), for example, found that only about 10 percent of small business lending is 
from banks with no branch in the local region. This suggests that entrepreneurs 
are likely to rely mainly on banks within their home area which may provide 
better lending terms through long-term relationships (Berger and Udell 1995). 
Furthermore, when they should incur higher transaction costs of borrowing from 
local lenders, entrepreneurs may search for alternative sources of financing such 
as crowdfunding.
29
 To the extent that crowdfunding serves as a viable alternative 
to traditional sources, we should see more crowdfunding activities in regions that 
have more concentrated credit markets. 
                                                 
29
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is just 1.8% in 2007, implying that the online channel may not be a viable option for creators in 






3.2.3 Consumer Substitution between Electronic and Physical Channel 
Since crowdfunding is thought of as an emerging online channel that 
provides access to credit to entrepreneurs, the literature on the consumer 
substitution between online and traditional offline channels is also useful for our 
study (Lieber and Syverson 2012). Starting with the seminal paper by 
Balasubramanian (1998), theoretical studies on multichannel retailing provide 
valuable frameworks for understanding the competition between online and 
offline vendors (see Forman et al. (2009) for more literature). One strand of 
empirical research has examined the factors affecting consumers’ channel choice 
such as product variety (Brynjolfsson et al. 2003), product information (Koppius 
et al. 2004; Kuruzovich et al. 2008), lower transaction costs (Kambil and Van 
Heck 1998), price (Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000). Especially, previous empirical 
research has found that consumer demand through the Internet is higher when 
their local markets face higher prices, face higher sales tax rates, have more local 
content online, or have fewer local physical stores (Anderson et al. 2010; 
Brynjolfsson et al. 2009; Ellison and Ellison 2009; Goolsbee 2000, 2001; Sinai 
and Waldfogel 2004). The literature implies that geography plays a role in driving 
consumers’ online demand. We contribute to this literature by highlighting how 
local credit market structure can affect an entrepreneur’s behavior on an online 
crowdfunding market.           
In addition, a small body of research suggests that consumers’ online 
demand for local products can be different with product type. Blum and Goldfarb 






products have their demands reduced by distance. They found that “taste-
dependent” products such as music, pornography, and gambling are affected by 
geographical distance, while more homogenous products such as software and 
technology are not. Hortascu et al. (2009) also found a negative effect of distance 
on trade on online auction sites and observed a strong “home bias” effect. They 
further observed that the negative distance effect is strongest for goods that are 
location-specific, such as opera tickets. Using a similar kind of reasoning, we 
expect that there is likely to be a certain home bias in contribution patterns for 
project types that are ‘location-dependent.’ 
3.3 Data and Empirical Analyses 
3.3.1 Data and Variables 
For this study, we have collected data from several sources. We gathered 
information on crowdfunding activity from Kickstarter, which is a leading 
crowdfunding platform. The site started operations in April 2009 and provided a 
market where everything from films, games, and music to art, design, and 
technology can be supported with the help of a large number of contributors. We 
extracted data regarding all transactions on Kickstarter from its inception to 
January 2013 and could locate 35,156 successful projects, 33,022 unsuccessful 
projects, and 2,476 live projects. As compared with overview statistics published 






73% of failed projects.
30
 The missing failed projects are mainly because of issues 
extracting data from Kickstarter.
31
 Among those projects, 62,163 projects are 
from the US. We focused only on US projects mainly due to the availability of 
geographical data. For each project we have information regarding the project 
owner-specific characteristics (e.g., user name, location) and project-specific 
characteristics (e.g., goal amount, pledged amount, category, project location, 
crowdfunders and their contributions).   
We know each project’s location, city and state, which allows us to 
determine local conditions for each project.
32
 We then matched each project to a 
Core-Based Statistical Area (CBSA). This may be either a Metropolitan Statistical 
Area (MSA) (containing an urban area of 50,000 or more population) or a 
Micropolitan Statistical Area (containing an urban area of at least 10,000 (but less 
than 50,000) population). Our use of CBSA as the unit of location is driven by the 
fact that Kickstarter provides only city and state information. CBSAs 
appropriately assign both the urban core and adjacent counties to one location. 
                                                 
30
We believe this is not a serious concern in our study. First, the rate of successfully funded 
projects is not systematically correlated with housing price change, as shown in Figure 4. Thus, 
this suggests that having the missing observations are little likely to bias our results. In addition, 
we also consider the amount of contributions which is less sensitive to the missing observations. 
According to the 2012 Kickstarter stat, it has received $320 million in pledge in 2012, while our 
sample has a total of $313 million during the same period. We got qualitatively the same finding 
for the amount of contributions.   
31
 Kickstarter makes it hard to find failed projects, since projects are not indexed for Internet 
searches and there is no page on the site to find projects that didn’t meet their funding goals. The 
failed projects are on the profile pages of project contributors, though. We visit every contributor 
and attempt to get as many projects as possible. Thus, this method cannot collect around 11% of 
failed projects that get no funding. Also, around 30% of failed projects fund less than 20% of the 
goal amount.  
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 We also know the location of each project owner for about 98% of projects in Kickstarter. The 
locations of projects and project owners are the same for about 90% of projects. As a result, our 
main findings are robust to using the location of project owners. Since there are formal and 
informal verification systems about project owners, it is highly likely that they truly release their 






However, our main analyses focus on the subset of MSAs for which we have the 
measure of housing supply elasticity (which we will explain in detail below), 
although other variables are more widely available for both metropolitan and 
micropolitan statistical areas. This measure is available for about 250 large 
MSAs. Since our sample includes the large MSAs, it covers about 90% of 
crowdfunded projects initiated since the introduction of Kickstarter.  
Once we matched each project to an MSA, we measured the level of 
crowdfunding activities made by project owners during our study period at the 
MSA and project category level. In our analyses, we focused on the MSA-
category level rather than the MSA level, because we also wanted to look at 
category heterogeneity in the effect of key variables of interest. Kickstarter 
provides 13 categories that project owners can choose for listing their projects. 
These are art, comics, dance, design, fashion, film & video, food, games, music, 
photography, publishing, technology, and theater. We considered three measures 
to represent cumulative crowdfunding activities at the MSA-category level during 
the period. The three measures are the number of total projects per million people 
at the MSA-category level, the log of the number of total projects at the MSA-
category level, and the log of total contributions (in $) to all projects at the MSA-
category level. Tables 1 and 2 present the definitions and the descriptive statistics 
of crowdfunding activities as well as other variables.  
We also have all of the individual contributions for each project in our 
sample. All the projects in our data have attracted 4,429,622 specific contributions 






location, accounting for 29.0% of all contributions, suggesting that experienced 
crowdfunders are more likely to share location information. Crowdfunders in the 
US comprise 68% of all crowdfunders that share location information and are 
responsible for 20.5% of all contributions. We exploit this information to 
determine the type of each category. We first considered all the contributions 
from crowdfunders who release their location and examined whether the 
contributions are made to ‘local’ projects, i.e., which come from the 
crowdfunders’ home MSA. We then calculated the share of ‘local’ contributions 
for each category. Table 3 presents this by category.
33
 We see that dance, food, 
and theatre have a higher share of local contributions than the other categories. In 
contrast, the game and technology categories received most of the contributions 
from non-local crowdfunders. This is consistent with recent evidence that even in 
online transactions geographical distance matters more for certain products (Blum 
and Goldfarb 2006; Hortascu et al. 2009). Since there are a significant number of 
contributions for each category, despite a small share of crowdfunders with 
location information we are confident that our sample is capturing the qualitative 
difference across categories accurately. In this paper, we will call projects in some 
categories with a high share of local contributions as ‘location-dependent’ and 
call those in other categories with a low share as ‘location-independent’.          
To this data, we add relevant demographic and socioeconomic variables 
from multiple sources. First, our key variable of interest is the housing price 
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index. We get the housing price index at the MSA level from the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency to use as a proxy for the availability of credit. Home equity 
comprising the majority of household wealth is important for obtaining credit 
because of the importance of personal collateral and guarantees in small business 
lending (Assunção et al. 2013; Avery et al. 1998). Also, home ownership has been 
shown to decrease the probability of loan denials (Cavalluzzo and Wolken 2005). 
This measure has been similarly used in other studies (Adelino et al. 2013; Fairlie 
and Krashinsky 2012). Hence, this variable allows us to test whether 
crowdfunding serves as a viable alternative to the traditional lending channels for 
creators who face tougher credit constraints. This is operationalized as the change 
in house prices at the MSA level between 2009 and 2012.
34
 We generally 
observed housing price decline in a local region during our study period. 
Another key variable is bank branch density which is a measure of bank 
accessibility. To operationalize this, we used data from the US Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation on the number of financial branches. The land area data 
collected from the 2010 US Census is used as a denominator to transform the 
number of financial branches in an MSA into the variable bank branch density. 
Thus, this measure represents transaction costs of using offline bank branches 
(Forman et al. 2009) and/or competition among banks in a local region 
(Brynjolfsson et al. 2009). As the number of competing bank branches in a local 
market decreases, people will incur more costs of using the channel  (Kerr and 
Nanda 2011) and are, on the margin, more likely to use the online crowdfunding 
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channel for financing where they do not incur transaction costs due to 
geographical distance.  
           In addition, we used as control variables several demographic and 
socioeconomic variables that previous literature had shown to be key 
determinants of entrepreneurship. We first included the Internet connectivity as 
proxied by the number of high-speed internet service providers (ISPs). The 
information on the number of ISPs at the county level is extracted from the 
Federal Communications Commission.
35
 This information is then averaged across 
all counties in an MSA. This variable represents the diffusion of the Internet 
within the MSA which may affect crowdfunding activity (Agarwal et al. 2009; 
Seamans and Zhu 2011; Wallsten and Mallahan 2010). We included several 
variables to represent local economic conditions. We first used Small Area 
Income and Poverty to get information on the median household income. We 
collected data on the unemployment rate from Bureau of Labor Statistics. We also 
got data on the number of small establishments from the County Business 
Patterns. Small establishments are those with 1-4 full-time employees. These 
variables are used to test whether better local economic conditions induce local 
people to create more crowdfunded projects in expectation of greater 
contributions. 
We also collected MSA-level data on total population, education profile, 
race profile, and age profile from the American Community Survey (ACS). These 
variables as a whole helped account for several determinants of entrepreneurship 








such as a pool of entrepreneurs, consumer base, and labor input. The ACS is a 
nationwide survey designed to collect and produce economic, social, and 
demographic information annually. The information from the ACS allowed us to 
control for the underlying propensity of the MSAs to engage in crowdfunding. 
3.3.2 Empirical Implementation 
Crowdfunding activity is assumed to depend on house price index and 
bank branch density, on socio-economic factors, on demographic factors, on 
category dummies, and on MSA-specific unobserved factors. Therefore, 
crowdfunding activity can be expressed by the following model:   
                                              (5) 
where the subscript represents MSA m in category j at year t. We use three 
outcome variables to measure the crowdfunding activity in the MSA-category-
year level,      . These are the number of total projects per million people at the 
MSA-category level, the log of the number of total projects at the MSA-category 
level, and the log of total contributions (in $) to all projects at the MSA-category-
year level.   
In addition,       represents the housing price index at the MSA-year 
level. Another key independent variable is the bank branch density at the MSA 
level.    is a vector of MSA-specific variables that we think do not vary much 
over time. This vector includes total population, median income, number of ISPs, 
and some demographic variables, such as age, gender, and race profiles.    
represents time-varying MSA-specific control variables: unemployment rate and 






controlling for MSA-specific unobserved factors. We included a vector of 
category fixed effects    that controls for fixed category specific differences such 
as category size, crowdfunding rate, competition, etc.    
Alternatively, we can write this as a first-differences model: 
                                            (6) 
Given that we will use only two time periods(2009 and 2012), we drop time 
subscript t. Note that bank branch density and the term    in equation (1) gets 
differenced out because it refers to time constant factors. However, to account for 
the possibility that some MSA-specific variables, including bank branch density, 
might drive the change in crowdfunding activity, we include the baseline value of 
those variables as additional controls. This means that the effect of those variables 
on crowdfunding activity is different between the two time periods. We also 
include category dummies to capture the average change in crowdfunding activity 
over the period of analysis. Thus, our revised model is the following: 
                                           (7) 
We used three-year differences between 2009 and 2012 to capture the 
effect of changes in housing prices on change in crowdfunding activity because 
Kickstarter started its operation in 2009. We estimate the first-differences 
specification by running regressions for 2009-2012. The growth in the 
unemployment rate is measured between 2009 and 2012, while the growth in 
small establishments is between 2008 and 2011 due to unavailability of 2012 data. 






before our study period. We log-transformed total population in the analysis and 
clustered the standard errors by MSA level.   
Despite the first-differences setting and the control variables, it is 
challenging to establish a causal relationship between credit availability and the 
creation of crowdfunded projects, since there are many omitted time-variant 
variables that could simultaneously affect both housing prices and crowdfunding 
activities. For example changes in expected household income in the area or 
improvements in entrepreneurial opportunities can affect both housing prices and 
crowdfunding activities. As a result, we need an exogenous source of variation in 
housing price change to properly identify the effect of credit availability on 
crowdfunding activities. We instrument housing price change between 2009 and 
2012 with the measure of MSA-specific housing supply elasticity of Saiz (2010).  
Housing supply elasticity is constructed using geographical and regulatory 
constraints to the expansion of housing volumes.
36
 Therefore, an increase in 
housing demand during the economic boom period is likely to translate into 
higher housing prices and collateral value in low elasticity areas, whereas it 
translates into a greater volume of houses built in high elasticity areas (Adelino et 
al. 2013). In the same logic, when bad economic conditions reduce housing 
demand, we observe smaller decreases in housing prices in high elasticity areas 
than in low elasticity areas. Figure 1 confirms that this is shown in our data. In 
Figure 1 housing prices change more significantly in low elasticity areas than in 
high during the period 2000-2012. Column (4) of Table 6 also provides evidence 
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to confirm this. The housing supply elasticity is positively and significantly 
associated with housing price increase. Using exogenous restrictions on housing 
supply will thus provide us with proper identification unless our instrument 
impacts crowdfunding activities for reasons other than changes in housing price. 
This identification strategy has also been implemented in recent papers (Adelino 
et al. 2013; Mian and Sufi 2011).  
Our main analysis takes bank branch density as exogenous to predict the 
propensity to use crowdfunding. We believe that this assumption is valid in our 
study and do not expect that reverse causality exists. It is unlikely that the 
anticipation of many crowfunding projects in an MSA encourages banks to enter 
the region given that crowdfunding is still in its infancy. Also, omitted variable 
biases may not be significant. Some unobserved socioeconomic factors or 
preference may lead to a higher crowdfunding demand while affecting the number 
of local banks. However, since the number of local bank branches in 2008 that we 
used in our model predates the rise of crowdfunding, it is unlikely to be correlated 
with any unobserved factor that affects creator’s crowdfunding demand during 
2009-2012. Nonetheless, we collected data on the number of local bank branches 
in 2000 which should be more exogenous and used it as the instrument variable 
for the number of local bank branches in 2008 in a robustness check 
(Brynjolfsson et al. 2009).     
There are two additional properties of our empirical framework that are 
important to discuss here. First, one could argue that during our study period, 






a negative relation between housing price change and crowdfunding. However, 
we are examining cross-sectional variations in crowdfunding activities across 
MSAs rather than within-MSA variations over time. Hence, even when all the 
MSAs experience a decline in housing prices, we could get a positive coefficient 
for a change in housing prices if MSAs with a smaller decline in housing prices 
have more crowdfunding activities. Another possible specification is to 
disaggregate observations to the MSA, category, and year level, conducting panel 
data regressions. This helps control further for time trends in crowdfunding 
activities by including yearly dummies. However, the biggest concern for this 
model is that it is a challenge to assemble suitable time-varying instruments for 
the housing price index. Since our study period is relatively short (i.e., 2009-
2012), GMM-typed regressions are not feasible for our study. Nevertheless, in a 
robustness check we show that our main findings are qualitatively similar when 
we conduct panel data regressions without any instrument. 
3.4 Empirical Results 
3.4.1 Geography of Crowdfunding 
We first present geographical variation in crowdfunding activities to see how 
crowdfunded projects spread across CBSAs. In order to generate Tables 4 and 5, 
we used all the US-based projects in both MSAs and non-MSAs. Table 4 reports 
the geography of crowdfunded projects on Kickstarter by CBSA across time. The 
three centers of crowdfunding activity are New York, Los Angeles, and San 






all years. However, the share of the top three CBSAs has continuously decreased 
from 43.3% in 2010 to 28.2% in 2012 while the number of crowdfunded projects 
has increased by around six times during the same period. For the top ten CBSAs, 
their total shares of crowdfunded projects have also decreased from 61.1% to 
45.2%. On the other hand, the share of non-top ten CBSAs has increased from 
38.9% to 54.83% during the same period.  
 Now we compare the distribution of crowdfunded projects with that of 
projects funded by a conventional funding source, venture capital funding. Since 
venture-backed firms are generally technology-based,
37
 we first focus on 
technology-based crowdfunded projects. We define projects in Technology and 
Game categories as technology-based crowdfunded projects. Figure 2 shows that 
technology-based crowdfunded projects are more disperse across regions than 
other types of crowdfunded projects. This may suggest that access to capital has 
been more important for entrepreneurs in remote small cities who create 
technology-related projects, as compared with other types of projects. This may 
also reflect that technology-related projects attract the majority of contributions 
from outside and technology entrepreneurs in small cities thus get relatively more 
benefit from crowdfunding than those in large cities. Next, we compare the 
distribution of crowdfunded projects with that of venture-backed firms in Figure 
2. When we confine only to game and technology projects, the top 3 CBSAs is 
taking only 20% of projects which is much lower than their share (34%) in terms 
of venture-backed firms. On the other hand, the share of non-top ten CBSAs in 
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technology-based crowdfunded projects is 60%, which is much higher than 40%, 
the share in venture-backed firms. This implies that small cities are more active in 
using crowdfunding. To the extent that small cities are more difficult to get 
funding from venture capital, this provides some evidence that crowdfunding is 
democratizing access to capital.   
 In Table 5, we report the geography of contributions by CBSA over time 
based on the location of crowdfunders. To generate this table, we used more than 
1.1 million contributions that have the location information of crowdfunders. We 
find similar patterns to what we see in crowdfunded projects. The share of the top 
three has continuously decreased from 50.3% in 2010 to 38.3% in 2012, with the 
average share of 39.2%. The non-top ten CBSAs account for 35.7% of all 
contributions in all years. When we confine our analysis only to game and 
technology projects, the share of the top 3 (10) CBSAs in total contributions is 
20% (43%). This suggests that compared with venture capitalists, more 
crowdfunders are located outside of the top three CBSA’s (Chen et al. 2010). The 
36% share of the non-top ten CBSAs in total contributions is smaller than the 
non-top ten shares of around 51% in terms of the number of projects. In this 
regard, the non-top ten CBSAs appear to get a disproportionate benefit from 
crowdfunding. 
3.4.2 Main Effect on Crowdfunding 
Figure 3 shows the relationship between the change in housing prices and the total 
number of crowdfunded projects at a scatterplot of our raw data. In order to draw 






analyses. While crowdfunding activities vary by MSAs, we have a downward 
sloping regression line. This suggests that housing price changes are strongly and 
negatively correlated with crowdfunding activities in these 249 MSAs.  
 We conducted a series of regressions to examine the effect of both housing 
prices and bank branch density on crowdfunding activities. Columns 1 through 3 
of Table 6 report findings from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates without 
instrumenting housing price changes. Our coefficient of interest, i.e., housing 
price increase, is negative and highly significant for all three dependent variables. 
This indicates that a decrease in housing prices drives creators under tighter credit 
conditions to rely more on crowdfunding. The effect is economically significant. 
The coefficient on the change in housing price in column (2) of Table 6 shows 
that a 10-point decrease (about one standard deviation change) in housing prices 
translates into a 7 percent increase in the number of crowdfunded projects in 
MSA-category which corresponds to about one project. When it comes to total 
contributions, a 10-point decrease in housing prices leads to a 46 percent increase 
in total contributions to all projects in MSA-category which corresponds to an 
increase of $52,387 in total contributions. This implies that the effect of the credit 
availability may be stronger for larger projects, because total contributions put 
more weight on larger projects.   
 Since the house price change is likely to be endogenous, we next 
instrument for this using the housing supply elasticity developed by Saiz (2010). 
In column (4) we show the first stage regression of housing price change on the 






highly significant at the 0.1% level and positive, implying that high elasticity 
MSAs experienced a lower decline in housing prices between 2009 and 2012.  
 From column (5) we report the second stage regressions with the housing 
supply elasticity as an instrument for the change in housing prices. We generally 
see negative and significant relationships between crowdfunding activities and the 
housing price changes. Regarding the log of the number of projects, the two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) regression is not significant (p-value is 0.16). However, the 
Poisson IV regression is highly significant at 0.1% level, since it increases 
efficiency.
38
 Our IV regressions indicate that ignoring endogeneity could bias the 
OLS estimates toward zero. This makes sense because omitted variables such as 
unobserved investment opportunities are likely to affect both housing prices and 
crowdfunding in the same direction.  
 We note that the demand effect, if any, will not purely drive our findings. 
The literature suggests that the effect of housing price increases can also be 
explained by the demand channel that housing price growth increases the local 
demand for crowdfunded projects. However, if there is any demand effect, it 
should drive the coefficient for the housing price increase upwards, thus making it 
harder to find a negative coefficient. Therefore, the negative coefficient reflects 
that limited availability of collateral in the form of lower housing prices can 
positively affect the creation of crowdfunded projects by project owners.     
 Table 6 also shows the effect of bank branch density on crowdfunding 
activities. The OLS and 2SLS regressions both imply that the number of banks in 
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a local market is not statistically associated with the propensity of initiating 
crowdfunded projects.
39
 However, this does not mean that bank branch density 
has nothing to do with the creation of crowdfunded projects. Below we provide 
more nuanced results for bank branch density. With respect to the control 
variables, our results are in line with expectations. We find that MSAs with more 
educated people and more people aged between 40 and 59 are associated with 
more crowdfunding activities. Furthermore, bigger cities tend to initiate more 
crowdfunded projects because more people are living in those cities. However, we 
do not find that people in big cities necessarily have a higher propensity to use 
crowdfunding. Internet connectivity is generally not significant. An increase in 
unemployment rate may lead to a reduction in crowdfunding activities, although 
the relationship is not statistically significant. 
Heterogeneous Effect of Housing Price Increase across Different MSAs  
We do not expect all areas to be equally influenced by housing price 
change. We examine whether the effect of credit availability varies across MSAs. 
One important question is whether housing prices will have a stronger effect on 
crowdfunding in high income MSAs. On one hand, low income entrepreneurs 
could rely more on crowdfunding, because they are more likely to need to get 
external funding. On the other hand, given that higher income represents better 
skills and more wealth, high income areas might be better in getting successful 
funding from crowdfunding. In our data, the mean (median) number of 
crowdfunded projects at MSA-category level is 2 (0) for the bottom 25% income 
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MSAs and 53 (10) for the top 25% income MSAs. Hence, the credit availability 
may matter mainly for high income people who have a certain level of wealth and 
skills.  
To test this, we interact housing price increase with median household 
income at a MSA. We present the estimates obtained from the 2SLS models in 
columns (1)-(3) of Table 7. The interactions for all the three models are negative 
and also statistically significant except for total contributions, indicating that the 
effect of housing prices increases with the median income at a MSA. We further 
compare the effect between the top 25% and bottom 25% income MSAs. We 
observe that the effect of housing price change is significant only for high income 
MSAs (see columns (4)-(9)). Low income MSAs are not influenced significantly 
by house prices. This may suggest that entrepreneurs in high income areas are 
better in creating successfully funded projects so that they are more active in 
using crowdfunding in response for a temporary credit shock through decreasing 
housing prices. This may also suggest that a temporary credit shock in the form of 
decreasing housing prices is less likely to discourage high income entrepreneurs 
from initiating crowdfunded projects. This finding is consistent with a theoretical 
prediction of Evans and Jovanovic (1989) that the propensity to start a new 
business is a function of personal wealth if would-be entrepreneurs are credit 
constrained.  
We further compare the effect between the top 25% and bottom 25% high 






share of educated people (unreported but available upon request).
40
 All in all, our 
findings suggest that crowdfunding is helpful mainly for high-ability 
entrepreneurs who are facing a temporary credit shock because of a drop in 
housing prices but have higher income and skills. This finding is in line with 
some studies showing that high-income, educated people are more likely to adopt 
the Internet (Goldfarb and Prince 2008; Sinai and Waldfogel 2004).  
Table 7 also shows the effect of bank branch density on crowdfunding 
activities. We find that an increase in local banks is now statistically associated 
with a decrease in the propensity of initiating crowdfunded projects. Project 
owners are less likely to fund their projects by crowdfunding as they have more 
local banks so can borrow money easily and cheaply. 
 Heterogeneous Effect of Housing Price Increase across Different Categories 
We now turn to the differential effect of housing price increase across 
different categories. We examine the differential effect of housing prices on 
creation of crowdfunded projects across categories. From a theoretical point of 
view, we expect that projects which require large capital are likely to be more 
dependent on housing prices (Guiso et al. 2004; Hurst and Lusardi 2004). As 
such, showing a bigger effect of housing price change on crowfunding activity 
will corroborate the collateral channel story. We examine variation in the scale of 
projects across categories. The effect of credit availability is likely to be stronger 
for categories that need greater funding, since entrepreneurs will face more 
difficulty leveraging their houses to finance their larger projects. Entrepreneurs 
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are likely to use different forms of credit, such as small business loans, credit card 
loans, home equity loans and traditional bank loans, to finance their projects. 
When they launch small projects, they may succeed in funding their projects 
without seeking for alternatives. On the other hand, when they initiate large 
projects, they may need to find another source of financing such as crowdfunding. 
Table 3 shows that there is significant variation in the average goal amount by 
category, ranging from $5,347 (Dance) to $41,189 (Game). We will use the 
average goal amount in a category as a proxy for the average project size in the 
category.    
Since increased demand through higher housing prices can also be 
different with categories, we focus on another project characteristic: share of local 
contributions. Although all contributions are made online, some categories may 
attract more local contributions. ‘Location-dependent’ projects which cater more 
to local consumers’ tastes can get more contributions from local crowdfunders 
than ‘location-independent’ projects. In this regard, an increase in demand due to 
an increase in housing prices may benefit certain categories more than others. To 
directly measure the demand effect we exploit variation in the share of local 
contributions across categories. We observe that there is huge variation in the 
share of local contributions across categories ranging from 3.72% (game) to 
49.71% (theater). Since local demand is more important for certain categories 
with a higher share of local contributions, we expect that an increase in local 






Table 8 shows the results from the 2SLS estimates where we have the 
interactions of housing price increase with both the share of local contributions 
and the average project size. We include both of the two interaction terms since 
having them together will help us examine both the collateral and demand effects. 
Categories with larger projects may attract less contribution from local people, 
thus making the average project size correlate with the share of local 
contributions. Hence, having both of the interaction terms will allow us to 
separate out the two effects. We present the results for the whole sample in 
columns 1 through 3. For all three dependent variables, the coefficient on the 
interaction between housing price increase and average project size is negative 
and statistically significant, indicating that the effect of the decline in housing 
prices is stronger for categories that require large funding. The effect tends to 
monotonically increase with the average size of a category. This is consistent with 
the collateral channel of credit availability being an important mechanism for the 
creation of large crowdfunded projects. This confirms that a simple demand story 
is not driving our results. The coefficients on the interaction between housing 
price increase and the share of local contributions are all negative but statistically 
significant only in column (1).    
We next split the sample into two groups by the share of local 
contributions. We report the 2SLS estimates in columns (4), (6), and (8) for 
categories with low shares of local contributions and in columns (5), (7), and (9) 
for those with high shares. We still see the negative interaction effects of housing 






the share of local contributions, we have more consistent results after splitting the 
sample. For categories that have high shares of local contributions, we observe 
that the net effect of housing price change decreases as a category has a higher 
share. This is likely because the demand effect is significant for this group and 
increases with the share of local contributions. On the other hand, for categories 
that have low shares of local contributions, the interaction between housing price 
change and the share of local contributions is significantly negative. Given the 
demand effect is likely weak in this group, this may suggest that the share of local 
contributions also capture other differences in categories such as different 
incentives of crowdfunders across categories. We note that our findings are not 
significant for total contributions.            
We further observe that bank branch density is generally stronger for 
categories that have a low share of local contributions. This effect is not 
significant for categories that have high shares of local contributions. Thus, the 
impact of bank branch density on crowdfunding demand is almost entirely via 
‘location-independent’ projects that attract less from local people. This implies 
that entrepreneurs are more likely to seek crowdfunding over bank lending when 
they want to initiate technology-based projects, because most of contributions 
come from outside for those types of projects. Meanwhile, ‘location-dependent’ 
projects offered online are virtually immune from the consumer substitution 
between crowdfunding and traditional banks. This is consistent with Brynjolfsson 
et al. (2009) showing that the competition between online and offline channels is 






3.4.3 Robustness Checks 
Validity of Instrument 
Our identification relies on the assumption that housing supply elasticity 
affects the creation of crowdfunded projects only through its effect on housing 
prices. The exclusion restriction would be violated if housing supply elasticity is 
correlated with crowdfunding activity for reasons unrelated to housing price 
drops. First, one possible concern with the instrument is that bank lending 
behavior was different between low and high elasticity areas (Adelino et al. 
2013). If other forms of credit were also less available in low elasticity MSAs 
relative to high elasticity MSAs during our study period for reasons other than 
housing price drop, this would violate the exclusion restriction for our instrument. 
To test this, we used data on denial rates of mortgage applications from the House 
Mortgage Disclosure Act. We assume that higher denial rates represent overall 
stricter credit decisions in a local market. The denial rate is defined as the number 
of denied applications divided by the total loan applications in a MSA and in a 
year. We then computed the proportional change in denial rates between 2008 and 
2011.
41
 We find that there is no significant difference in denial rates between low 
and high elasticity areas, as shown in column (1) of Table 9. We further added as 
a proxy for overall local credit condition the proportionate rate in denial rates 
directly to our main models and find in column (2) of Table 9 that our main 
findings still hold.
42
 Last, since small business lending is also a major source for 
small businesses, we accumulated data on small business lending from the 
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Community Reinvestment Act and calculate the proportionate rate in small 
business lending which may have reflected the overall local credit condition. Our 
findings are robust to including this (see columns (3) of Table 9). Overall, these 
findings allow us to rule out an alternative explanation that our instrument may 
pick up differences in credit conditions across MSAs for reasons unrelated to 
housing prices.  
Word-of-Mouth Effect 
The crowdfunding literature suggests that crowdfunding activity can be 
partly explained by the word-of-mouth (WOM) effect (Aggarwal et al. 2012). If 
the WOM effect were stronger in low elasticity areas relative to high elasticity 
areas, this would make our estimates biased. While it is not obvious why this 
should necessarily be the case, we want to address this. Since measuring the 
WOM effect in a local area is challenging, we cannot completely rule this out but 
suspect this will be the case. We have already controlled for several variables, 
such as population, education, age, income, and race, which might be correlated 
with the WOM effect (Aral and Walker 2012). Hence, an omitted variable bias, if 
any, is likely to be small. For example, if large cities happen to have low elasticity 
areas, this might bias our estimates because large cities are likely to have greater 
WOM. Adding population to our model helps us control for this. Furthermore, we 
use Google trends to generate the search volume on ‘crowdfunding’ across states 
in the US. It is likely that higher search volume represents greater popularity of 






directly add this as a proxy for WOM, our main findings still hold as shown in 
column (4) of Table 9.   
In this regard, each city is likely at a different stage in the diffusion 
process given that Kickstarter started its business in 2009. For example, people in 
big cities may be more familiar with Kickstarter and crowdfunding than those in 
small cities, which may bias our results. To address this issue, we now consider 
only projects initiated in 2012 when the business model is likely to be stabilized 
and find qualitatively the same findings (results available upon request). 
Quality Effect 
Someone could argue that, when housing prices are going down in an area, 
it has more crowdfunded projects not because of (temporary) difficult access to 
traditional funding for entrepreneurs who have promising ideas but because of 
more low-quality projects in the area that should not be funded anyway. We 
believe that this is not a serious concern due to at least three reasons. First, we 
already control for several variables, such as median household income and 
education, that may affect the quality of projects. Second, we examine the 
relationship between housing price change and the ratio of successfully funded 
projects in an area. To the extent that the status of successful funding is related to 
true quality, it could provide a valuable insight. Figure 3 shows no relationship 
between housing price changes and the success rate at a MSA, indicating that the 








 Last, if housing price change leads to more low-quality projects, we 
are likely to observe a weak effect on total contributions of housing price change, 
since this measure is weighted by the amount of funding collected. We do not see 
this from our data. Column (8) of Table 6 suggests that the effect is highly 
significant and even greater than the effect on the number of crowdfunded 
projects in column (6) of Table 6. 
Panel Data Regressions 
Since our main cross-sectional models rely heavily on the validity of our 
instrument, there is always the fear that our instrument may be correlated to some 
unobserved regional variables that could also affect crowdfunding activities. To 
dampen this concern, we also conducted panel data regressions while noting a big 
caveat of this approach to not have any instrument for the housing price index. 
Below is the panel data model we are based on: 
                                               (8) 
where the subscript represents CBSA m in category j at year t.
44
    is a vector 
of location-level variables which vary by CBSA-year. We include a vector of 
CBSA fixed effects    that controls for differences across CBSAs that do not 
change over time and are common for all categories. Finally, we include in each 
estimation a vector of category-year fixed effects,    , that control for changes in 
category sizes, crowdfunding rates, competition and so on. These category-year 
fixed effects also control for different variation in crowdfunding propensity across 
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 Furthermore, we regress the measure on house price change and the same control variables as in 
our main specification and find no significant relationship between house price change and the 
success rate. 
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categories over time. We cluster standard errors by CBSA. Table 10 shows that 
our main findings are qualitatively the same. Our two main variables of interest 
appear to become more significant both when we use only the same set of MSAs 
as our cross-sectional models (see columns (1)-(3)) and when we include all the 
MSAs where all the variables in the models are available (see columns (4)-(6)). 
Endogeneity of Bank Branch Density 
We now account for potential endogeneity of bank branch density. We 
collected data on the number of local bank branches in 2000 which should be 
more exogenous and used it as the instrument variable for the number of local 
bank branches in 2008. We present the results in Table 11. Table 11 indicates that 
our main findings are robust to accounting for this. Furthermore, we observe a 
significant difference in the effect of bank branch density across MSAs. This 
effect is significant only for MSAs that have a low number of banks. This may 
suggest that the marginal effect of having another bank branch diminishes with 
the number of bank branches. 
Nonlinear Effect of Change in Housing Prices  
We examined the effect of housing prices on crowdfunding during the 
period 2009-2012 when house prices were generally decreasing because of the 
recent financial crisis. Thus, one could argue that the importance of collateral 
availability is overestimated and it may have been less if we had tested in the 
normal economic period with rising house prices. Since our sample is a short 
panel which spans only from 2009 to 2012, it is not feasible to test this for now. 






normal economic periods. In our sample, there are a limited number of MSAs 
with rising housing prices during our study period, while most MSAs were facing 
declining housing prices. We split the sample into two groups depending on 
whether the housing price at an MSA has dropped between 2009 and 2012. Table 
12 shows that housing prices are more influential for MSAs that have declining 
house prices. This may imply that under normal periods, the collateral effect 
running through housing prices may not be large and significant enough. 
However, we have to be cautious about interpreting the finding, since the two 
groups are not the same. Ideally, we would want to compare the effect of housing 
prices on crowdfunding for the same MSAs between in the period of rising 
housing prices to the period of declining housing prices. 
3.5 Conclusion 
 In this paper, we examine how geographic factors affect the creation of 
crowdfunded projects to provide some insights for the potential of crowdfunding 
to democratize access to capital. We find that small cities appear to get a 
disproportionate benefit from crowdfunding. In addition, we use a series of 
analyses to show that difficulty in accessing credit from local credit markets 
induces entrepreneurs to rely more on crowdfunding to fund their projects. 
Moreover, this effect varies across categories and across areas. We find that 
tighter credit constraints due to a drop in housing prices have a stronger effect on 
entrepreneurs who initiate larger projects and live in high income MSAs, which 
further supports that our main findings are primarily driven by the collateral effect 






structures is almost entirely via ‘location-independent’ projects that attract less 
from local people, whereas ‘location-dependent’ projects offered online are 
virtually immune from the competition between online crowdfunding and offline 
banks.  
The findings have interesting implications for the growing literature on 
crowdfunding, and more broadly for the entrepreneurship literature. Our findings 
indicate that crowdfunding can serve as a viable alternative for traditional sources 
of financing. As such, we provide evidence that web-enabled crowdfunding has 
potential to democratize access to capital in that it can be a viable option for 
entrepreneurs having difficulty accessing traditional channels of financing. One 
important question unanswered is whether crowdfunding supports entrepreneurs 
who are temporarily cash-strapped but have promising ideas (i.e., positive net 
present value projects) or those who have flawed projects that should not be 
funded anyway. We find some indication that crowdfunders are to some extent 
selective in supporting projects.  Having that said, we are unable to formally 
address this question here, because we do not have proper quality measures of 
projects. It would be of interest to examine whether reduced financing constraints 
brought about by crowdfunding will lead to changes in the composition of 
projects and entrepreneurs (Guiso et al. 2004).  
In line with this, it is also worthwhile to examine whether crowdfunding 
will increase the diversity of innovations. The current study examines the effect of 
crowdfunding on the rate of innovation. However, it does not examine whether 






support a variety of creative projects such as arts, theatre, dance, and music, it is 
highly likely to be true. Those creative projects are rarely funded by conventional 
funding sources including venture capitalists and angel investors. Given 
crowdfunders are motivated not only by financial incentives but also other types 
of incentives, we may see more diverse sets of innovations with the introduction 
of crowdfunding. Future research needs to dig deeper into this.           
Our findings have implications for policy makers. From a policy 
perspective, our findings imply that crowdfunding has the potential to 
democratize access to capital. As such, our study provides some supporting 
evidence that the JOBS act signed recently will be crucial for entrepreneurs who 
are cash-strapped. Having that said, our findings also suggest that crowdfunding 
will be more beneficial for high-ability entrepreneurs who are facing a credit 
shock but have high education and income. This implies that we may see ‘the rich 
get richer’ phenomenon from web-enabled crowdfunding. This finding is 
consistent with other work which suggests that the Internet exacerbates regional 
wage inequality (Forman et al. 2012). Thus, policy makers need to think more 
carefully about the role of crowdfunding as a means to democratize access to 
capital.       
Our finding indicates that technology-related projects tend to attract the 
vast majority of investments outside of their home regions. This shows sharp 
contrast with venture capital investments that are geographically concentrated. 
Hence, crowdfunding may become a more viable option for promising technology 






Francisco, Boston, and New York. Nevertheless, since the industry is still in its 
infancy, more research is needed to look at the long-term effect of crowdfunding 
on technology entrepreneurs. 
Our study focuses on the behavior of market participants, especially 
entrepreneurs, in a reward-based crowdfunding market. However, they are likely 
to behave differently in an equity-based crowdfunding market (Ahlers et al. 2012; 
Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2013). Given the importance of the equity-based 
crowdfunding in supporting ‘real’ innovative firms, it is worthwhile to examine 
whether we would still find evidence of democratizing access to capital in the 
equity-based crowdfunding. If crowdfunders worry about the ability of invested 
firms to raise subsequent funding because of their location, geographical 
dispersion of crowdfunding activity in the equity-based crowdfunding may not be 
as large as it is in the reward-based crowdfunding (Agrawal et al. 2013b). It 






CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION 
 
In this dissertation I investigate how IT-enabled platforms impact 
entrepreneurial activities. Specifically, I explore the behaviors of both investors 
and entrepreneurs in the IT-enabled crowdfunding markets that have the potential 
to democratize access to capital and entrepreneurial investment. As the Internet 
has not only fostered connectivity, but also transformed funding channels, my 
objective is to examine the concept of democratization of access to capital and to 
information about expertise in the context of crowdfunding. Despite a significant 
number of studies that examine the role of the Internet in transforming retail 
channels, there have been few studies how the Internet is changing the way 
funding is raised for small businesses. Given the importance of innovation and 
entrepreneurship in the creation of jobs, having better understanding of this issue 
should be important for both academics and industry.  
In addition to identifying the effect crowdfunding can have on crowd 
funders, entrepreneur, and policy makers, this dissertation highlights many fruitful 
opportunities for future work. First, It would be interesting to examine how 
crowdfunding, especially equity-based crowdfunding, will influence the rate and 
direction of innovations. In other words, to what extent will it affect the number 
as well as types of innovations that are funded? The second essay of my 
dissertation provides some evidence that crowdfunding may increase the number 
of promising new ideas that are funded by increasing the total amount of available 
funding. Nonetheless, little is known about whether and how crowdfunding 






interesting to investigate what regions have the most successful crowdfunding and 
what can explain the phenomenon.  
Second, social networks and technology in crowdfunding is another 
direction for the future research. The rules and technical features established by 
individual platforms, along with overall industry regulations, will shape the 
behavior of investors as well as entrepreneurs. Given investors’ difficulty in doing 
careful due diligence on any crowdfunding platform, supplying some mechanisms 
that reduce market failures in crowdfunding is particularly important. In line with 
this, the first essay of my dissertation shows that quality signals sent by reputable 
investors are an important tool to reduce the information asymmetry between 
entrepreneurs and crowdfunders. I would like to further examine other types of 
mechanism systems, including reputation systems like eBay’s and third-party 
intermediaries, to see how these mechanisms increase transparency and encourage 
the development of crowd wisdom. 
Third, I am more broadly interested in examining the social and economic 
implications of crowdsourcing which has the potential to transform the way in 
which knowledge and innovation works can be done. Online cloud labor markets 
(e.g., oDesk) and innovation contest platforms (e.g., Topcoder) will be an 
interesting context for my future research. Several studies have exploited the 
nature of knowledge works to examine strategic management and the impact of IT 
resources. In line with this, it would be an interesting topic to examine how the 
nature of knowledge works affects the nature and outcome of crowdsourcing 






and diversified inquiry, as my dissertation represents one of the few studies on 
crowdfunding and more broadly crowdsourcing. There is significant research 










Figure 2.1: Survival Estimates by Type of Investors and by Experience 
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Note: X axis represents year and quarter from 2000 to 2012. Y axis represents the housing price index. 




Note: Top 3 CBSAs are areas that are within the top 3 in terms of the number of projects or firms. Top 4-10 
CBSAs are defined the same way. 
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Note: X axis represents housing price change measured between 2009 and 2012 at a MSA. Y axis represents 
the level of crowdfunding activity which is defined as the log of the number of crowdfunded projects. 
 




Note: X axis represents housing price change measured between 2009 and 2012 at a MSA. Y axis represents 
the success rate at a MSA which is defined as the ratio of successfully funded projects to total initiated 
projects. 
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Listings 
Variable 
All Concept Live 
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Listing attributes  
Price 3.64 26.28 5.30 40.43 2.45 3.86 
Max. Amount 18,895 34,500 23,453 38,279 15,549 31,095 
Reserve 3,980 11,120 4,501 10,028 3,606 11,845 
Apple (1=yes) 0.77 0.42 0.79 0.41 0.76 0.43 
Company (1=yes) 0.62  0.67  0.58  
Concept (1=yes) 0.42      
Funding Outcome  
Amount funded 1,892 6,865 2,795 7,048 1,245 6,667 
Number of investors 6.15 13.65 10.20 19.14 3.26 6.17 
Fully funded 
(1=yes) 
0.46  0.50  0.44  
Number of 
observations 
532 222 310 
 




Experienced investors Crowd 
Mean No. obs Mean No. obs Mean No. obs 
Investment intensity       
Cumulative amount 
per investor 
330.13 67 14,641.82 17 209.76 1,030 
Cumulative number 
of investments 
2.52 67 22.24 17 1.82 1,030 
Investment 
concentration 
      
Investment 
concentration 
0.83 28 0.44 17 0.84 318 
Investment timing       
Days to investment 18.89 168 21.28 213 24.51 3,120 
Days to investment 
(Concept) 
17.42 114 21.55 146 24.92 2,038 
Days to investment 
(Live) 
21.98 54 20.69 67 23.97 1,066 
Note: The investment concentration is equal to∑  
                    
                
  
  
   
. For this measure, we drop 







Table 2.3: Investment Timing and Investor Type 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
All All All concept Live All 
App Developer Investors 0.279*** 0.312** 0.381*** 0.536*** -0.237 0.016*** 
 (0.102) (0.119) (0.098) (0.105) (0.207) (0.005) 
Experienced Investors 0.399*** 0.534*** 0.566*** 0.656*** 0.384** 0.027*** 
 (0.101) (0.109) (0.082) (0.121) (0.185) (0.005) 
Ln(Price)  -0.028 -0.050 -0.025 -0.325** -0.001 
 
 (0.029) (0.037) (0.037) (0.141) (0.002) 
Ln(Reserve)  0.052*** -0.015 0.003 -0.183*** 0.001 
 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.026) (0.039) (0.001) 
Ln(Maximum funding)  -0.197*** -0.176*** -0.342*** 0.046 -0.010*** 
 
 (0.026) (0.033) (0.053) (0.061) (0.002) 
Apple  -0.165** -0.147 -0.471*** 0.806*** -0.003 
 
 (0.069) (0.098) (0.123) (0.290) (0.004) 
Company  0.126* 0.353*** 0.099 0.182 0.013*** 
 
 (0.073) (0.083) (0.133) (0.188) (0.004) 
Concept  0.046 0.059   0.002 
 
 (0.077) (0.096)   (0.005) 
Category fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects  No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.1499 0.1638 0.1847 0.2015 0.2219  
N 50999 49814 49814 36587 12724 49942 
Note: The table reports discrete-time models of investments. Standard errors are clustered by investors. App 
Developer Investors (Experienced Investors) are a binary variable equals to 1 if an investor is an App 
Developer Investors (or an Experienced Investor) and 0 if otherwise. We also include 100 dummies for the 
first 100 days after the listing of a project to have a flexible baseline hazard rate. *** significant at 1%; ** 
significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
 
Table 2.4: Influence of Experts on the Crowd 
 All subsequent investors Only the subsequent crowd 
DV: Ln (Amt of backing in day t) All Concept Live All Concept Live 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln( Influence of App Developer 
Investors) 
0.184*** 0.208*** 0.129** 0.151*** 0.180*** 0.059 
 
(0.056) (0.063) (0.051) (0.054) (0.060) (0.054) 
Ln (Influence of Experienced 
Investors) 
0.050** 0.065 0.092*** 0.024 0.037 0.054* 
 (0.025) (0.042) (0.031) (0.022) (0.041) (0.028) 
Cumulative amount/1000 -0.004 -0.016 -0.022 0.019 0.006 -0.021 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.045) (0.020) (0.024) (0.044) 
Cumulative num. of specific 
investments 
-0.002 -0.000 -0.047** -0.004 -0.002 -0.042** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.020) (0.005) (0.004) (0.018) 
Percentage needed 0.006** 0.011 0.000 0.003 0.004 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) 
App fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R^2 0.1554 0.1761 0.1306 0.1402 0.1655 0.1062 
N 10438 4994 5444 10438 4994 5444 
Note: The table reports app-fixed effects regressions. Standard errors are clustered by apps. The influence is 
calculated as the sum of cumulative amounts of investments in prior projects made by reputable investors in a 






Table 2.5: Source of Influence of Experts on the Crowd 
DV: Ln (Amt of backing by the crowd in 
day t) 
All Concept Live All Concept live All Concept Live All Concept live 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Ln (Influence of App Developer Investors 
with successfully funded apps) 
0.161** 0.160** 0.184*    
      
 (0.073) (0.078) (0.109)          
Ln (Influence of App Developer Investors 
without successfully funded apps) 
-0.029 -0.031 0.017 -0.078 -0.102 -0.001 
      
 (0.041) (0.066) (0.048) (0.050) (0.077) (0.051)       
Ln (Influence of App Developer Investors 
with successfully funded apps in the same 
category) 
   0.230** 0.227* 0.204 
      
    (0.100) (0.123) (0.124)       
Ln (Influence of App Developer Investors 
with successfully funded apps in the 
different categories) 
   0.099 0.100 -0.001 
      
    (0.081) (0.089) (0.077)       
Ln (Influence of App Developer Investors 
with listed apps when investing) 
      0.155** 0.160** 0.107 
   
       (0.064) (0.070) (0.070)    
Ln (Influence of App Developer Investors 
without listed apps when investing) 
      -0.120** -0.130 -0.040 
   
       (0.046) (0.088) (0.028)    
Ln (Influence of App Developer 
Investors) 
         0.122** 0.136** 0.055 
          (0.053) (0.066) (0.056) 
Ln (Influence of Experienced Investors) 0.029 0.046 0.054* 0.041* 0.070 0.053* 0.028 0.050 0.049*    
 (0.022) (0.043) (0.028) (0.024) (0.050) (0.028) (0.023) (0.044) (0.028)    
Ln (Influence of Experienced Investors in 
successfully funded apps) 
         0.077*** 0.104** 0.068*** 
          (0.030) (0.052) (0.026) 
Ln (Influence of Experienced Investors in 
non-successfully funded apps) 
         0.031 0.109 0.024 
          (0.048) (0.120) (0.055) 
App fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R^2 0.1398 0.1636 0.1072 0.1421 0.1670 0.1064 0.1408 0.1640 0.1074 0.1438 0.1710 0.1065 






Note: The table reports app-fixed effects regressions. Standard errors are clustered by apps. The influence is calculated as the sum of cumulative amounts of investments in prior 
projects made by reputable investors in a listing. In columns (1)-(3) we split the influence of App Developer Investors into two groups in terms of whether App Developer 
Investors have their own successfully-funded apps. In columns (4)-(6) we further split the influence of App Developer Investors with their own successfully funded apps into two 
groups in terms of whether App Developer Investors have their own successfully funded apps in the category where they invest in. In columns (7)-(9) we split the influence of App 
Developer Investors into two groups in terms of whether App Developer Investors have their own listed apps when investing. In columns (10)-(12) we split the influence of 
Experienced Investors into two groups in terms of whether Experienced Investors made an investment in a successfully funded apps. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * 






Table 2.6: Different Measures of the Influence of App Developer Investors 
DV: Ln (Amt of backing by the 
crowd in day t) 
All Concept Live All Concept Live 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln (Influence of App Developer 
Investors with successfully funded 
apps) 
0.522 0.884** 0.198    
 (0.377) (0.363) (0.378)    
Ln (Influence of App Developer 
Investors without successfully 
funded apps) 
-0.830*** -0.890*** 0.174 -0.911*** -0.803** -0.293 
 (0.289) (0.324) (0.443) (0.280) (0.336) (0.559) 
Ln (Influence of App Developer 
Investors with successfully funded 
apps in the same category) 
   1.719*** 1.662*** 1.019 
    (0.461) (0.458) (0.690) 
Ln (Influence of App Developer 
Investors with successfully funded 
apps in the different categories) 
   -0.382 -0.262 0.156 
    (0.316) (0.496) (0.408) 
Ln (Influence of Experienced 
Investors) 
0.046* 0.080 0.060* 0.046* 0.079 0.060* 
 (0.027) (0.053) (0.033) (0.027) (0.052) (0.033) 
App fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R^2 0.1355 0.1603 0.1051 0.1386 0.1612 0.1051 
N 10438 4994 5444 10438 4994 5444 
Note: The table reports app-fixed effects regressions. Standard errors are clustered by apps. The influence for 
App Developer Investors (experienced investors) is calculated as the number of existing app developer 
investors (the sum of cumulative amounts of investments in prior projects made by experienced investors) in 
a listing. In columns (1)-(3) we split the influence of App Developer Investors into two groups in terms of 
whether App Developer Investors have their own successfully-funded apps. In columns (4)-(6) we further 
split the influence of App Developer Investors with their own successfully funded apps into two groups in 
terms of whether App Developer Investors have their own successfully funded apps in the category where 






Table 2.7: Credibility of the Signals - Ex-post Performance 
DV: Ln (Cumulative 
Num of App 
Downloads) OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ln(Total Amount of 
Funding) 0.177*** 0.165*** 0.149*** 0.134*** 0.125*** 0.164*** 0.139*** 
 
(0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.040) (0.039) (0.047) (0.040) 
Ln(Total Amount of 
Funding)*Concept 
 
    -0.094 -0.088 
      (0.106) (0.099) 
Ln(Price)   -0.164 -0.163 -0.148 -0.151 -0.153 -0.142 
 
 (0.112) (0.104) (0.106) (0.099) (0.108) (0.103) 
Apple  -1.046*** -0.813*** -0.767*** -0.599** -0.819*** -0.607** 
 
 (0.254) (0.241) (0.264) (0.238) (0.241) (0.238) 
Company  0.226 0.139 0.329* 0.211 0.133 0.205 
 
 (0.189) (0.197) (0.183) (0.182) (0.195) (0.180) 
Concept  -0.008 0.011 0.087 0.075 0.632 0.657 
 
 (0.232) (0.260) (0.226) (0.261) (0.688) (0.636) 
App age  0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 










(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
App rating  
  




(0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) 
Category FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R^2 0.0912 0.4579 0.4874 0.4813 0.5012 0.4886 0.5021 
N 376 366 320 366 320 320 320 
Note: The table reports OLS regressions at a project level. Standard errors are clustered by developers. The 
dependent variable and other time-varying independent variables are measured as of Jun. 2013 except for 
global rank measured on Feb. 2013. I also include a dummy variable equal to 1 if an app has a cumulative 






Table 2.8: Robustness checks 
 Rho-Differencing Dynamic GMM 
DV: Ln (Amt of backing 
in day t) 
All Concept Live All Concept Live 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln (Influence of App 
Developer Investors) 
0.164*** 0.197*** 0.029 1.520* 1.736* -0.476 
 
(0.055) (0.068) (0.051) (0.912) (0.953) (1.882) 
Ln (Influence of 
Experienced Investors) 
0.033 0.054 0.042 0.190 0.070 0.780* 
 (0.024) (0.044) (0.028) (0.301) (0.325) (0.436) 
Cumulative amount/1000 -0.106 -0.230 0.053 -0.378* -0.129 -0.437 
 (0.085) (0.146) (0.082) (0.224) (0.131) (0.297) 
Cumulative num. of 
specific investments 
0.009 0.033 -0.222** 0.136*** 0.085** 0.217* 
 (0.098) (0.114) (0.111) (0.053) (0.033) (0.126) 
Percentage needed 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.007 0.016*** 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
App fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 10460 4994 5443 9751 4814 4916 
Note: The table reports app-fixed effect regressions after rho-differencing in columns (1)-(3). Standard errors 
are clustered by apps. The influence is calculated as the sum of cumulative amounts of investments in prior 
projects made by reputable investors. For columns (1)-(3) we first rho-difference our models and again 
conduct app-fixed effect regressions using the rho-differenced variables.   *** significant at 1%; ** 







Table 3.1: Variable definition 
Variable Definition Source 
Number of crowdfunded 
projects 
Number of projects at Kickstarter Kickstarter 
Credit availability House price index 
Federal Housing Finance 
Agency 
Internet connectivity  




Unemployment rate Unemployment rate Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Number of small 
establishments 
Number of establishments with 1-4 
employees 
County Business Patterns 
Total population Total population American Community Survey 
Bank branch density Number of bank branches/Land area 
US Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation and 2010 US 
Census 
Median household income Median household income 
Small Area Income and 
Poverty 
% White % population white people American Community Survey 
% Bachelor % population university graduates American Community Survey 
% Male % population male American Community Survey 
% population between 20 
and 39 
% population between 20 and 39  American Community Survey 
% population between 40 
and 59 









Table 3.2: Summary Statistics 






Number of crowdfunded 
projects in MSA-category 
17.08 102.70 0 3,503 3,237 
Number of crowdfunded 
projects per million residents in 
MSA-category  
11.76 23.69 0 478.01 3,237 
Total contributions ($) to all 
projects in MSA-category  
123,036 917,538 0 29,600,000 3,237 
Number of total contributions 
of all crowdfunders in MSA-
category  
229 1011 0 25,944 3,237 
House price index in MSA  167 24.26 109.69 253.32 3,237 
Change in house price index in 
MSA 
-8.94 11.81 -46.23 30.45 3,237 
Number of internet service 
providers in MSA 
18.72 5.69 8.33 39 3,237 
Unemployment rate in MSA  0.08 0.03 0.03 0.27 3,237 
Number of small establishments 
in MSA 
12,334 29,345 238 333,741 3,237 
Total population in MSA 905,401 1,844,948 28,657 18,900,000 3,237 
Bank branch density in MSA 1.03 1.07 0.01 8.64 3,237 
Median household income in 
MSA 
50,238 9,047 30,513 80,101 3,237 
% white in MSA 79.23 11.64 47.69 96.89 3,237 
% bachelor in MSA 26.13 7.75 12.5 55.9 3,237 
% male in MSA 49.20 0.89 47.07 51.89 3,237 
% population between 20 and 
39 in MSA 
27.45 2.86 20.9 40 3,237 
% population between 40 and 
59 in MSA 
27.55 2.27 16.5 32.2 3,237 
Note: The level of crowdfunding activities are measured between April 2009 and January 2013. House price 
index and unemployment rate are measured between 2009 and 2012. Number of small establishments is 














Table 3.3: Key Characteristics by Category 
Category Share of local contributions (%) Average project size in category ($) 
Art 27.91 $6,456 
Comics 8.06 $8,037 
Dance 46.19 $5,347 
Design 6.88 $24,130 
Fashion 14.43 $9,152 
Film 25.66 $22,066 
Food 32.67 $14,488 
Games 3.72 $41,190 
Music 25.91 $8,976 
Photography 23.41 $6,969 
Publishing 18.19 $12,162 
Technology 6.52 $29,950 










Table 3.4: Geography of Crowdfunded Projects at Kickstarter 
  Num of projects Share (%) 
MSA MSA name 2010 2011 2012 Total 2010 2011 2012 Total 
35620 New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA 1511 3200 4073 9304 25.71 16.52 12.21 14.97 
31100 Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA 728 2485 3841 7436 12.39 12.83 11.51 11.96 
41860 San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA 304 1035 1499 3008 5.17 5.34 4.49 4.84 
16980 Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI 230 804 1245 2429 3.91 4.15 3.73 3.91 
42660 Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 151 526 970 1748 2.57 2.72 2.91 2.81 
14460 Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH 154 549 896 1698 2.62 2.83 2.69 2.73 
38900 Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA 184 552 730 1541 3.13 2.85 2.19 2.48 
12420 Austin-Round Rock, TX 122 457 636 1279 2.08 2.36 1.91 2.06 
37980 Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD 104 383 603 1150 1.77 1.98 1.81 1.85 
34980 Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro, TN 102 368 580 1098 1.74 1.90 1.74 1.77 
 Others 2286 9011 18293 31472 38.90 46.52 54.83 50.63 
 Total 5876 19370 33366 62163 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 








Table 3.5: Geography of Contributions at Kickstarter 
  Num of contributions Share(%) 
MSA MSA name 2010 2011 2012 Total 2010 2011 2012 Total 
31100 Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA 4,590 27,794 137,153 175,937 10.08 13.13 16.90 15.46 
35620 New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA 15,027 43,639 90,671 157,669 33.01 20.62 11.17 13.85 
41860 San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA 3,280 18,844 82,696 112,361 7.21 8.90 10.19 9.87 
42660 Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 977 11,227 58,378 75,760 2.15 5.30 7.19 6.66 
16980 Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI 3,831 9,449 32,325 48,680 8.42 4.46 3.98 4.28 
14460 Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH 1,586 7,158 31,411 43,020 3.48 3.38 3.87 3.78 
38900 Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA 1,740 8,167 24,776 36,634 3.82 3.86 3.05 3.22 
12420 Austin-Round Rock, TX 969 5,159 25,767 33,142 2.13 2.44 3.18 2.91 
41940 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 330 1,776 24,236 28,729 0.73 0.84 2.99 2.52 
47900 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 368 2,475 12,822 19,624 0.81 1.17 1.58 1.72 
 Others 12,819 75,997 291,240 406,779 28.16 35.90 35.89 35.73 
 Total 45,517 211,685 811,475 1,138,335 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 







Table 3.6: Credit Availability and Crowdfunding Activity 
 OLS    2SLS IV 2SLS IV Poisson IV 2SLS IV 
Dependent 
variable 
Change in # 
















Change in # 




e in # of 
projects) 
Change in # 
of projects 
Ln(Chang




 to all 
projects) 
1st stage 2nd stage 2nd stage 2nd stage 2nd stage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Increase in 
Housing Prices -0.218*** -0.007*** -0.045*** 
 
-0.451*** -0.011 -0.066*** -0.101*** 
 (0.058) (0.003) (0.008)  (0.110) (0.008) (0.011) (0.023) 
Housing 
Supply 
Elasticity    3.029***     
    (0.639)     
Bank Branch 
Density -0.403 0.069 -0.204** 0.269 -0.312 0.071 -0.011 -0.182 
 (0.790) (0.052) (0.102) (1.001) (0.784) (0.051) (0.077) (0.118) 
Internet  
Connectivity  0.117 0.002 0.002 -0.391** -0.016 -0.001 -0.012** -0.030 
 (0.126) (0.006) (0.017) (0.164) (0.153) (0.008) (0.005) (0.025) 
Increase in 
Unemployment  
Rate -32.781 -1.984 -5.235 59.309 -30.898 -1.948 -1.304 -4.785 
 (26.544) (1.842) (5.017) (43.754) (27.927) (1.835) (2.244) (5.845) 
Increase in 
Small 
Establishments 0.003** 0.000 -0.000 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.000 0.000** 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln(Pop) 0.791 0.802*** 2.231*** 2.465*** 1.069 0.808*** 1.241*** 2.298*** 
 
(0.876) (0.048) (0.110) (0.751) (0.896) (0.049) (0.027) (0.122) 
Median Income -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% White 0.024 0.001 0.020** 0.241*** 0.075 0.002 0.022*** 0.032*** 
 
(0.053) (0.003) (0.008) (0.067) (0.057) (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) 
% Bachelor 0.915*** 0.039*** 0.188*** 0.184 0.940*** 0.039*** 0.083*** 0.194*** 
 
(0.147) (0.008) (0.023) (0.147) (0.147) (0.008) (0.007) (0.024) 
% Male 0.862 0.063 0.044 0.169 0.803 0.062 0.040 0.030 
 
(0.785) (0.044) (0.134) (1.061) (0.780) (0.044) (0.068) (0.140) 
% 20-39 0.377 0.022 0.015 0.132 0.501 0.024 0.043* 0.044 
 
(0.371) (0.020) (0.051) (0.519) (0.384) (0.019) (0.026) (0.062) 
% 40-59 0.968** 0.055** 0.099 0.563 1.122*** 0.058** 0.089*** 0.136** 
 
(0.392) (0.024) (0.064) (0.456) (0.388) (0.023) (0.011) (0.069) 
Cate FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R^2 0.3585 0.7559 0.5976 0.2739 0.3413 0.7156  0.5529 
N 3237 3237 3237 3237 3237 3237 3237 3237 
Note: The table reports the results from OLS and 2SLS estimations. Standard errors are clustered by MSA.  




















e in total 
amount of 
contributi
ons to all 
projects) 
Change in # of 
project  
per million people 
Ln(Change in # of 
projects) 
Ln(Change in total 
amount of 
contributions 

























 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Increase 
in House 











000 -0.044** -0.004** -0.006       
 (0.021) (0.002) (0.004)       
Median 
Income -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bank 
Branch 
Density -1.799* -0.078 -0.448*** -1.526 -1.228 -0.085 -0.060 -0.066 -0.286 
 (0.970) (0.078) (0.159) (2.794) (1.847) (0.143) (0.075) (0.753) (0.270) 
Control 
variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted 
R^2 0.3296 0.6162 0.5431 0.3587 0.3820 0.4009 0.7594 0.3600 0.3995 
N 3237 3237 3237 806 806 806 806 806 806 
Note: The table reports 2SLS estimations. Standard errors are clustered by MSA.  
























 for all 
projects) 
DV: Change in # of 
project per million 
Ln(Change in # of 
projects) 
Ln(Change in total 








































 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Increase in 
House Prices -0.001 -0.000 -0.024 0.770** -0.643* 0.077*** -0.044*** -0.002 -0.094 
 





contributions -0.012*** -0.000 -0.001 -0.061*** 0.027*** -0.004*** 0.002*** 0.001 -0.001 





amount/1000 -0.012** -0.000* -0.003** -0.019*** -0.082*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.003 -0.000 
 (0.005) (0.000) (0.001) (0.006) (0.027) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Bank Branch 




 (0.784) (0.051) (0.118) (0.490) (1.108) (0.063) (0.052) (0.118) (0.143) 
Control 
variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted 
R^2 0.3361 0.7127 0.5432 0.3196 0.3052 0.6516 0.6762 0.5068 0.5675 
N 3237 3237 3237 1494 1743 1494 1743 1494 1743 
Note: The table reports 2SLS estimations. Standard errors are clustered by MSA. For columns (4)-(9), we 
split the sample into the following two groups by the share of local contributions of each category: categories 
with the low share (below 20%) of local control contributions (comics, design, fashion, publishing, game, and 
technology) and categories with the high share (above 20%) of local contributions (art, dance, food, 
photography, theatre, film, and music).  








Table 3.9: Additional Tests for Endogeneity of Housing Price Change 
 
Change in denial 
rate 
Change in # of 
project per 
million 
Change in # of 
project per 
million 
Change in # of 
project per 
million 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Increase in House Prices  -0.468*** -0.497*** -0.505*** 
 
 (0.110) (0.156) (0.133) 
Housing Supply Elasticity -0.022    
 
(0.030)    
Proportional Change in denial rate  -0.096   
  (0.523)   
Proportional Change in small 
business lending   5.180  
   (13.448)  
Google Search Volume on 
‘Crowdfunding’    -0.030 
    (0.029) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R^2 0.0480 0.3348 0.3257 0.3408 
N 236 3068 2951 3237 
Note: The table reports 2SLS estimations. Standard errors are clustered by MSA. Denial rates extracted from 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act records are computed as the proportion of applications denied by the 
financial institution over total volume in each MSA and year. Data on small business lending is collected 
from the Community Reinvestment Act. The proportional change in denial rate is computed as (denial rate in 
a MSA and 2011-denial rate in a MSA and 2008)/denial rate in a MSA and 2008. The proportional change in 
small business lending is calculated the same way. Google search volume on ‘crowdfunding’ represents the 
search volume on ‘crowdfunding’ in a state relative to the highest point in the US which is always 100.     
 
Table 3.10: Panel Data Regressions 
 Same set of MSAs as cross-sectional All the MSAs 
 






 for all projects) 







 for all 
projects) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
House Price 
Index -0.134*** -0.016*** -0.061*** -0.082*** -0.010*** -0.050*** 
 
(0.028) (0.004) (0.012) (0.015) (0.002) (0.008) 
Bank Branch 
Density -3.286 -1.981* -6.297** -6.322* -2.086** -8.801*** 
 
(4.063) (1.143) (3.046) (3.423) (0.828) (2.656) 
Unemployment  
Rate -96.184*** -7.573*** -35.285*** -31.029*** -1.750** -12.164*** 
 
(18.751) (2.488) (8.575) (6.568) (0.707) (3.282) 
Internet  
Connectivity 0.092 0.025 0.010 0.073 0.007 -0.015 
 
(0.107) (0.016) (0.037) (0.063) (0.008) (0.025) 
Small 
Establishments 0.000** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln(Pop) 1.164 -0.493 7.360 4.346 0.293 5.538** 
 
(13.124) (1.804) (5.668) (4.785) (0.514) (2.370) 
Median 
Income -0.000 -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adjusted R^2 0.3567 0.4145 0.4435 0.1890 0.2129 0.2594 
N 12948 12948 12948 39013 39013 39013 
Note: The table reports panel data estimations. Standard errors are clustered by MSA. For columns (1) 
through (3), I use only the same set of MSAs used in our cross-sectional IV regressions. For columns (4) 
through (6), I include all the MSAs where all the variables used in the models are available. *** significant at 


























 for all 
projects) 
DV: Change in # of 
project per million 
Ln(Change in # of 
projects) 
Ln(Change in total 
contributions 































 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Increase in 
House 
Prices -0.451*** -0.011 -0.101*** -0.420*** -2.231 -0.010 -0.133 -0.127*** -0.185 
 
(0.110) (0.008) (0.023) (0.160) (1.960) (0.015) (0.115) (0.047) (0.203) 
Bank 
Branch 
Density -0.294 0.060 -0.142 -11.909* -3.378 -1.283*** -0.245 -4.464** -0.489 
 (0.817) (0.049) (0.120) (6.188) (4.998) (0.427) (0.293) (1.907) (0.559) 
Control 
variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Category 
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted 
R^2 0.3464 0.7548 0.5819 0.3811 0.0182 0.6365 0.4723 0.5111 0.4509 
N 3237 3237 3237 806 806 806 806 806 806 
Note: The table reports 2SLS estimations. Standard errors are clustered by MSA.  
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
 
Table 3.12: Nonlinear effects of HPI 
 
DV: Change in # of project 
per million Ln(Change in # of projects) 
Ln(Change in total 
contributions 






MSAs with a 
drop in house 
prices 
MSAs with an 
increase in 
house prices  







MSAs with a 
drop in 
house prices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Increase in 
House Prices 0.730 -0.520*** -0.026 -0.019 0.352 -0.109*** 
 
(1.731) (0.137) (0.067) (0.013) (0.438) (0.027) 
Bank Branch 
Density -0.811 -0.752 0.228 0.051 -0.530 -0.234* 
 (3.411) (0.863) (0.174) (0.048) (0.706) (0.134) 
Control 
variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cate FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R^2 0.3670 0.3378 0.7565 0.7562 0.4961 0.5674 
N 676 2561 676 2561 676 2561 
Note: The table reports 2SLS estimations. Standard errors are clustered by MSA.  
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